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Abstract
The stabilization and association  process launched  by the  liberalization,  aligning SEE-5 most-favored-nation
European Union in the aftermath  of the Kosovo  war in  (MFN)  applied  tariffs on industrial products with EU
1999 has created a new policy environment for five  MFN tariffs, and that priority  be given  to structural
South East European countries (SEE-5).  In exchange  for  reforms and regional cooperation aimed at trade
EU assistance,  the prospect of EU accession,  and the  facilitation. As inter-industry trade rather than intra-
continuation of preferential  access to EU markets,  SEE-5  industry trade dominates intra-SEE-5  trade, the potential
governments  have to upgrade  their institutions and  for expansion  in intra-SEE-5  trade  is limited at least
governance  by European standards and engage in mutual  within the confines of the existing  production structures
regional cooperation,  including stability pact member-  and transportation  infrastructure.  Therefore SEE-5  free
countries.  trade agreements are unlikely to contribute  to economic
Kaminski  and de  la Rocha examine  the benefits to  growth without concurrent efforts to improve
SEE-5 of trade  liberalization  along two  dimensions and  infrastructure, trade facilitation, business,  and investment
suggest conditions  under which these could  be  climate,  as well  as to increase competition  from MFN
maximized.  They argue that the process of regional trade  imports to external preferential suppliers through
liberalization should be extended  to multilateral  multilateral  liberalization.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
There  is  consensus among  policy  makers  and experts alike that the  solution to the  decade-long
crisis  in the  Balkans  lies  in their  economies.  All agree  that establishing  institutions  supporting
competitive  markets  together  with  integration  into European  markets  is  the  key to  economic
recovery and  regional  stability.  So  is regional  integration,  although this has much  less  political
support through the region  than  integration  into the European  Union.  Some  even predict faster
liberalization  in trade between the individual  countries  and the EU than between the countries  in
the region (Bartlett and Samardzija  2000).
Yet,  regional  cooperation  is  indispensable  not  only  to  address  such  problems  as
environment,  transportation  infrastructure  including  special  issues  related  to  the Danube  River,
movement  of goods  through  borders  (customs  procedures),  joint  activities  in the  fields  of
education and training but also to take full advantage of opportunities offered by integration  into
the  EU.  Some  of these  clearly  cannot  be  solved without  cooperation  among  governments  and
extemal  financial  support.  While  mere  coordination  may  be  sufficient  in  some  areas
(e.g., building  roads),  other projects  may call  for active  cooperation  at various  levels  of public
administration  in respective countries.
The commercial  logistics  of trading  that has  emerged  following  the  dissolution  of the
former  Social  Federal  Republic  of  Yugoslavia  (SFRY)  levy  huge  costs  on  importers  and
exporters.  The  five  South  East  European  countries  that  are  in  the  EU  Stabilization  and
Association  Process  (hereafter  SEE-51)  still  have  weak  political  institutions  and,  except  for
Albania,  a  fresh  history of cross-border  animosity.  Newly  established  borders  messing up the
movement of goods and complicating  the coordination  of cross-country  infrastructure  accentuate
the  costs already  imposed  by  geographical  conditions.  Consider  for instance  Former Yugoslav
Republic  (FYR)  of Macedonia.  FYR  Macedonia,  while  it  had  been  a republic of SFRY,  had
unfettered  access to seaports.  Now this is a landlocked country facing huge shipping costs due to
-the  reliance  on  shipping  by  land  as  a rule  around  seven  times  more  expensive  than  by  sea
(Hausmann  2001),  which,  in  turn  are  magnified  by  border  crossings.  Its  goods  destined  for
instance  to  Italy  crossed  the border  only  once  before  the  dissolution of former SFRY,  whereas
now they transit through at least three sovereign  states with  often highly taxing border controls.
If shipping  goods  across the  U.S.-Canadian  border  is  equivalent  to adding  from  400 to  1,600
kilometers (Ibidem),  then the magnitude of extra costs for SEE-5 traders and ultimately exporters
and consumers of imports is infinitely greater.
The Stabilization and Association (SA)  Process launched  by the EU seeks to address the
broad  issue  of the  European  integration  of these  countries  and,  within  this  framework,  the
problem of this new remoteness  as well as weaknesses  in economic  regimes of SEE-5  countries.
The  process,  committing  a  less  developed  partner  to  upgrading  its  institutions  to  European
standards  and  governance,  serves  as  both  an  anchor  making the  reforms  more  credible  and  a
guide to  institutional reforms.  This is  especially relevant  in SEE-5  region where most countries
had only reluctantly  implemented  liberal reforms.  Except for Albania,  other SEE-5 governments
had  initially  rejected  radical  approach  to  economic  reforms  and  pursued  gradualist  policies.
SEE-5  include  the  following  states:  Albania,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Croatia,  Former  Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia  (FYR Macedonia),  and Federal  Republic of Yugoslavia (FR Yugoslvia).  Within
the latter,  Kosovo and Montenegro  are autonomous  customs areas  with independent trade policies,  border
controls  and customs  administrations.  Bulgaria,  Romania  and  more recently  Moldova,  i.e.,  countries that
also  are  direct  beneficiaries  of the  Stability  Pact,  are  treated  separately.  Bulgaria  and  Romania  have
already  begun  accession  negotiations,  while  Moldova's  trade  with  the  region  is essentially  limited  to
Romania.3
Although  some  have  launched  comprehensive  privatization  programs,  owners  of  privatized
companies  were too often successful  in establishing quasi-monopoly  positions  thanks to political
contacts.  Entry to many sectors has remained  limited and so has been  competition with negative
implications  for  their  economic  growth  performance.  In  consequence,  over-regulation  of
business activity together with onerous tax burdens have led to the expansion of shadow economy
and thwarted  the development  of a competitive market environment (EWI 2000).
As a means for promoting European  integration  of the SEE-5, the  SA process  seeks  also
to reduce  the  complexity  of the  current commercial  logistics through  promoting  simplification
and greater transparency  in customs procedures  and free trade among  SEE-5  as well  as between
them  and  the  EU.  Important  steps  have  already  been  taken.  These  include  granting  as  of
September  2000  of  Autonomous  Trade  Preferences  (ATPs)  to  SEE-5  countries  (except  FR
Yugoslavia  which  obtained  them two  months  later in November),  and the  inclusion of a time-
bound  schedule  for  the  reciprocal  removal  of trade  restrictions  in the  two  Stabilization  and
Association  Agreements  concluded  to date (FYR Macedonia  and Croatia).  SEE-5  govemments
together with those from other Stability Pact countries  have already agreed to extend a network of
bilateral  free  trade agreements.  These two taken together have  set the  stage for policy-induced
integration  along two dimensions:  regional Balkan  integration and integration with the EU.
The paper focuses  on the five countries of South Eastem  Europe in the EU Stabilization
and  Association  process-the  SEE-5-and  argues  that  the  two  dimensions  are  inseparable  in
order for trade  liberalization  to succeed, as only when these are pursued together do they offer the
greatest opportunity for gains.  But there are two important caveats.  First, integration  along these
two dimensions without addressing the third dimension of multilateral, MFN-based  liberalization
may  be  counterproductive  leading  to trade  diversion  and  losses  in national  economic  welfare.
Second,  gains from  integration  into the EU do  not come  by default,  as the experience  of some
Central  European  'associates'  of the  EU  demonstrates  (Kaminski  2001).  They  require  strong
political commitment to  liberal  reforms  aimed  at improving business  climate  and cooperation to
remove  barriers  to wider markets.  The other SEE countries  do not form object of this study but
are included in the discussion whenever relevant.
The  remainder of this  paper is  organized  as  follows.  Section 2 briefly discusses  the SA
dimension  of regional  integration,  i.e.,  policy parameters  of trade liberalization  as they pertain to
EU-SEE-5  regional integration  drawing on the literature  on North-South  integration.  The central
question  is  about  conditions  under  which  SEE-5  would  maximize  unique  benefits  that poorer
partners  usually  obtain  from  integrating  into  a rich  partner.  Section  3 assesses  implications  of
establishing  a free trade  area  among  SEE-5  countries  without  both  multilateral  and  preferential
(vis-a-vis the EU) tariff liberalization.  Section 4 turns to issues  relevant to the assessment  of the
second  dimension  of trade  liberalization  efforts,  i.e.,  Free  Trade  Areas  (FTAs)  among  SEE-5
economies.  It seeks to  assess the scope for  short-term export response  to bilateral  liberalization
of trade  among SEE-5  countries  by examining  developments  in their trade,  the composition  of
intra-SEE-5  trade and the extent to which this trade remains  below its potential.  If it is the case,
then  the  removal  of trade barriers  would  have  a  strong  positive  impact  on  economic  growth.
Section  5 traces welfare  effects  of various variants  of trade  liberalization.  Section  6 concludes
and sketches policy implications.4
2.  TRADE  DIMENSION  OF STABILIZATION AND  ASSOCIATION  PROCESS:
POTENTIAL RETURNS  AND PITFALLS
Policy-induced  integration into the EU is the most important  aspect of the overall SA process, as
it  commits  SEE-5  countries  to  upgrading  institutions  and  policies  to  European  standards  and
governance.  It  also serves  as an  anchor assuring  greater public support and, thereby,  facilitating
implementation  of structural  reforms.  In  addition,  various  EU-funded  programs  of bilateral
assistance  tied  to  the  progress  in  convergence  of respective  SEE-5  economic  regimes  to  EU
institutions  and  policies  provide  an  extra  incentive  to  implement  structural  reforms.  While
potential  returns  are  huge  to  all  participants  of this  process,  they  do  not come  by default  and
require a number of complementary  policy measures.  This section  identifies benefits  as well as
points to dangers associated with the trade component of the SA process, if not accompanied  by a
simultaneous  movement  in  two  other  dimensions  of trade  liberalization-FTAs  among  SEE-5
countries  and MFN liberalization.
The  SA  process  yields  several  benefits  to  SEE-5  countries  usually associated  with the
"North-South"  integration.  In  general,  it  provides  strong  incentives  to  a  'South'  country  to
become  gradually  like  a 'North'  country  in terms of institutions  and policies.  These incentives
derive  not only from aspirations to accede to the EU, which calls for the convergence of domestic
regimes to the acquis communautaire but also  from opening of the economy to competition  from
imports from the EU and better  access to EU markets.  The  latter may contribute to the increase
in foreign  investment inflows.
In  contrast  to countries  that  signed  Europe  Association  Agreements  with the  EU,  until
recently  SEE-5 countries  had experienced  little, if any, external  pressure to open their economies
to  competition  from  imports  and  introduce  business  friendly  regulations.  The  weakness  of
autonomous  trade  preferences2 (ATPs) offered  by the EU to  some Balkan countries  prior to the
introduction of the SA process was that they did not contain  any mechanisms that would  induce
politicians  to  liberalize  their  economies  and  establish  business  friendly  environment.  In  a
nutshell,  prior to  the introduction  of the  SA process,  ATPs  created  new opportunities  for trade
expansion  on  a  bilateral  basis  but  did  not  provide  direct  incentives  to  change  the  domestic
business environment.  The SA process changes  it, as  SEE-5 will be entitled to take advantage  of
the benefits offered only in so far as their policies meet certain criteria.3
The  introduction  of the  'conditionality-ridden'  SA process  has  very important  positive
implications  for  their  reforms  and  in  particular  for  foreign  trade  and  investment  regimes'
liberalization.  First,  it  provides  guidance  and  incentive  to  SEE-5  governments  to  undertake
measures  that would  align  their economic  regimes  with the EU  acquis communautaire.  While
full harmonization with the acquis requires  rather sophisticated administrative capacities,  starting
the harmonization  process, for instance, with customs  procedures and streamlining the barriers to
entry to business activity does not require substantial  resources.  These are 'win-win'  cases, as the
introduction of these measures  has the potential  to improve governance,  business and investment
2 The EU-having  repealed the  1980  Cooperation  Agreement  with the former Socialist Federal Republic
of  Yugoslavia,  which  offered  the  SFRY  preferential  access  to  its  markets  under  autonomous  trade
preferences  (ATP regime)-continued  providing ATPs to some  countries of the former SFRY. Bosnia and
Herzegovina  and  Croatia  were  under  the  ATP  regime  reviewed  annually,  while  FYR  Macedonia  has
benefited  (as  of I January  1998)  from  preferential  market  access under bilateral  Cooperation  Agreement.
For  the  discussion  of concessions  offered  under the  ATP regime,  see  Box  3.2.  (p.  60)  in  World  Bank
2000b.
3 For a more detailed discussion,  see Michalopoulos (2003).5
climate  and,  thereby,  boost domestic  and  foreign  investment  and  increase  competition  in  local
markets.
Second,  the  SA process  also compels  governments  to lower tariffs  on  imports  from the
EU.  The trade component of the Stabilization  and Association Agreements  (SAAs) concluded to
date, while retaining the ATP provisions  extended in 2000-01  to the  SEE-5 countries,4 envisages
the establishment of free trade areas between each SEE-5  and the EU with the former dismantling
its tariff barriers only gradually over time.  Since imports from the EU account for more than half
of their  total  imports,  this  will  significantly  increase  domestic  competition  for  tradables  and
consequently competitiveness  of domestic products in international  markets.
However,  leaving  aside  the  absence  of structural  reforms  that  should  accompany  the
implementation  of the  SAAs,  pursuance  of liberalization  focused  solely  on  the  conditions  of
access  for products originating in the EU engenders  two additional pitfalls.  First, if preferential
treatment envisaged  in the SAAs  is not extended  to intra-regional  SEE-5 trade,  SEE-5 risk to be
victimized  by  the  "hub-and-spoke"  syndrome  that  offers  higher  benefits  to  EU  firms  at  the
expense of SEE-5.  The "hub-and-spoke"  pattern  as a rule favors  rich and large countries  while
impoverishing  small  and  poor  (Baldwin  1991).  Firms  located  in "spokes"  are  likely to  have
larger  costs for two reasons: they face higher barriers than hub firms when importing  inputs from
the other spokes; and they tend to be penalized  by lower demand  from other spokes  due to trade
barriers.  The  hub  and  spoke  arrangements  may  further  exacerbate  the  "agglomeration
economies"  effect,  i.e.,  investments  tend to be attracted to regions with already high intensity  of
investments  thus  contributing  to  deepening  of regional  differences  in  the  level  of economic
development.  Last but not least, FTAs confined  only to the EU would discourage  intensification
of trade ties among SEE-S  economies,  which is one of the objectives of the SA process.
Second,  in  the  absence  of  both  multilateral  liberalization  and  SEE-5  regional
liberalization,  suppliers  from  the  EU  may  crowd  out  more  efficient  suppliers  from  countries
subject  to MFN tariffs as well as charge a higher  price than  in international  markets.  Since  the
EU  is  already  the  major  trading  partner  for  each  SEE-5,  the  scope  for the  switch  in  supply-
sources of SEE-5,  that is trade diversion,  would appear limited.  But, in spite of the fact that costs
and prices  of EU industrial  suppliers  are  mostly  in line with  costs  and prices  in the rest of the
world,  this  cannot be  entirely excluded.  Similarly,  EU suppliers,  especially those  from  sectors
where competition  from  imports  assures  high  levels of competition  in EU markets,  may charge
SEE-5  importers  prices  higher  than  in  EU  markets  to  take  advantage  of preferential  margins
offered by SEE-5 MFN rates, which are significantly higher than those in  the EU.
Integration  into EU:  Potential Returns
Advocates  of  regional  integration  point  to  dynamic  gains,  that  is,  its  favorable  impact  on
country's  economic  growth  over  the  medium  and  long term.  Dynamic  gains  are  due  to  the
decrease  of the "costs of trading"  combined  with  generation  of foreign  direct  investment  and
technology  spillovers.  They may  be offset by the  emergence of "hub and spokes"  patterns  and
the  rules  of origin-both  discussed  below.  While  neither  theoretical  analysis  nor  empirical
evidence  offers  conclusive  evidence  as  to  growth  effects  of integration  (Schiff  and  Winters,
4  "The  Council  Regulation  (No.  2007/2000)  of  18  September  2000  improved  market  access  for  all
countries  under  ATP  as  well  as  extended  the  ATP  coverage  to  Albania,  Kosovo  (under  UNMIK
administration)  and some Montenegrin  products.  Following  the demise of the  Milosevic regime,  ATP has
been  extended  to  the  rest  of the  FR  Yugoslavia,  and  restrictions  on  some  products  originating  in
Montenegro removed.6
1998a), gains are  more likely to transpire  in the case of "deeper" integration as it contributes  to
lowering  of transaction  costs.  The  theoretical  argument  is  built  around  the  proposition  that
integration by increasing  trade  leads to a temporary  increase  in growth.  But this only applies to
the  deep  integration  lowering  real  trading  costs.  Deep  integration  puts  an  economy  on  a
trajectory of higher levels of output per capita with growth  rates returning  to steady  state unless
the  growth  is  endogenized  thanks  to  'knowledge  content'  of increased  imports.  Furthermore,
traditional trade models suggest that capital and/or labor mobility brings convergence.  This is so
thanks to changes  in relative  prices  brought about by lower  import prices and  improved  export
prices,  and  a  higher  marginal  product  per  capita  attracting  higher  investment  and  growth
(Baldwin  1989).5
Similar  investment  and  growth  benefits  may  transpire  thanks  to  multilateral
liberalization.  Circumstantial  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  preferential  arrangements,  which
are  regional  rather  than  global,  are  not  intrinsically  advantageous  to  development.  Take,  for
instance,  East Asian economies.  In their spectacular economic  success  special arrangements  with
"Northern"  countries  and  institutions  of regional  integration  were  conspicuously  absent.  Their
impressive  economic  growth  performance  was  due  to  domestic  policies  of observing  market-
oriented "fundamentals,"  superior  accumulation  of physical and human  capital,  and the ability to
exploit opportunities  offered by  international  markets.  Neither  is the participation  in a regional
arrangement  a necessary condition to attract FDI.  The case of Greece  shows also that this is not a
sufficient  condition.  Similarly,  not  each  among  Central  European  "EU  associates"  has  been
successful  in attracting  FDI (Kaminski  2001).  If anything,  this seems to confirm the importance
of sound policies at home and access to wider markets.
Yet, inclusion  in regional economic  arrangements  usually entails the adoption of rules of
conduct,  commitments  and obligations  that go  beyond  trade  issues.  The  argument  in favor  of
participating  in  reciprocal  preferential  arrangements  is  strong  if this  involves  North-South
integration  as  exemplified  by the  SA process.  The  institutional  design  of SAAs  favors  deeper
integration  (i.e.,  lowering  "trading costs")  into the EU-a highly  developed  regional bloc.  This
offers  unique  opportunities  especially  to  less developed  SEE-5  partners  by  creating pressures  to
implement efficiency enhancing institutional  and policy reforms (World Bank 2000a).
Hence,  the  SA process  may provide  an extra  incentive  to SEE-5  governments  to  launch
sound economic policies  encouraging  openness  and integration  into international  markets  as well
as  introduce  institutional  changes  strengthening  business-friendly  environment.  More
importantly,  considering  that  general  public  in  SEE-5  countries  regards  accession  to  the EU  as
remedy  to  regional  instabilities  and  economic  malaise  (Steil  and  Woodward  1999),  there  is
another  potential  policy-related  return  from  the  SA  process.  Namely,  the  perception  that
implemented  policy measures  are necessary for accession to the EU may tip the political  balance
in favor of reforms,  albeit this outcome  is not automatically  assured, as the experience of several
Central European candidates amply illustrates.
The  general  point  is  that  SA  process  commits  SEE-5  governments  to  converge  their
respective  economic  regimes  to  those  in  the  EU  and  weakens  domestic  political  resistance  to
structural  reforms.  The  combination of credible  government  commitment  to reforms  and better
and  better  conditions  in  access  to  large  EU  markets  will  stimulate  domestic  and  foreign
investments and economic growth.
5 Note that since the share of SEE-5  trade with the EU is  higher than that for the EU, trade will be of more
benefit to a SEE-5  country.7
Piffalls:  Hub-and-Spoke  Pattern and  Rules of Origin
The  'hub-and-spoke'  pattern  is potentially  harmful  as  it  may produce  significant  distortions  in
allocation  of resources.  There  are two sources of distortions:  differences  in market  access  and
rules of origin.  Distortions due to market access  are mainly at the expense of 'spoke'  countries,
as the  'hub-and-spoke'  situation puts "spoke"  firms in disadvantage  vis-a-vis "hub" firms simply
because the latter have  better market access than  'spoke'  firms to other spokes.  Firms, especially
those operating  in increasing  returns-to-scale  industries,  may seek to  exploit  advantages  offered
by differences  in trade  barriers  and  relocate  or expand their activities  at hub at the  expense  of
spokes.  Although  preferential  access to  hub  markets  and  low wages  in  spoke  economies  may
offset  significant relocation  of industrial  activity  to hub and  generate  dynamic growth  effects in
spokes,6 the 'hub-and-spoke'  pattern  reduces benefits of integration to a "Southern"  partner.
The  choice  of rules  of origin  impacts  the  spatial  distribution  of production  activities
within FTA and may frustrate the objectives of economic  development.  The distinction should be
made  between  preferential  (as  stipulated  in  FTA)  and  World  Customs  Organization
nonpreferential  rules  of origin.  The  latter tend  to  be  more  restrictive  than  the  former,  simply
because they go beyond the usual "change-of-heading"  approach  typical for nonpreferential  rules
of  -origin  (see,  for  instance,  Krueger  1999,  Panagariya  1999).  Their  impact  on distribution  of
production  activities  within  FTA  depends  on  the  kind  of a  cumulative  system  that  is  used.7
Flexible  rules of origin  encourage  sourcing  of inputs  outside FTA  countries,  whereas  "...  strict
rules  of origin (...)  may affect  upstream,  side-stream  or downstream  third-country  producers  of
inputs" (UNCTAD  1998, paragraph 47).
The  preferential  rules of origin,8 an  indispensable  component of any FTA to avoid trade
deflection  as well as often to take into account interests of domestic industries,9 tend to offer extra
advantages  to  "hub"  firms  for three  reasons.  First, "spoke"  firms  operate within  much  smaller
economies  and,  therefore,  tend  to  rely  more  on  "externally"  imported  inputs  including  other
spokes.  This  often  puts a hub  firm  in  a better  position that  a similar spoke  firm in meeting  the
conditions for preferential  access.1 0 Since the  industrial  base of the EU or EFTA  is dramatically
6  Empirical  evidence  corroborates  this possibility.  In large part thanks to FDI, relocation  of higher value-
added  industries  from  CEECs  to the EU  has  not occurred.  To  the  contrary, most  FDI  in Hungary,  for
instance,  have  gone to  sectors  at a higher  end of the  technology  spectrum  (Hamar  1998,  Kaminski  and
Riboud  2000).  This  phenomenon  was  also  observed  in Ireland  albeit  after  accession  to  the  EU
(Barry  1996).
7  Cumulation,  i.e.,  the  requirement  that  sufficient  processing  of the  product  occurs  in any of the FTA
countries,  can  be  bilateral  (i.e.,  between  two  signatories  of FTA),  diagonal  or  partial,  and  full.  Full
cumulation  reduces  the  potential  for  trade  diversion  implicit  in FTA.  For  an  extensive  discussion,  see
UNCTAD  1998.  Needless  to add that non-cumulation is  more restrictive  than cumulation.
8 Rules  of origin  spell out the conditions  that a product  must satisfy  in order to be eligible for preferential
access  to  markets  as  determined  in  a regional  agreement.  The  rules  of origin  defined  in the  SAAs  and
Europe Association  Agreements  are  identical.  While the  agreements  use  change  of tariff heading  at the
four-digit level of the Harmonized  System to define  origin, they also use technical requirements  especially
for such products  as footwear, textiles and clothing.
9  'Trade  deflection'  describes  a  situation  when  an  importer  in  a high-duty  country  imports  a product
through a low-duty country  and  then re-export  it to  the importer's  duty-free.  Rules  of origin  are  used to
prevent it. However,  preferential  rules  are  often  specified  in ways  minimizing  competition  from  imports
and/or enhancing export prospects to the FTA partner.
10  Note  also  that  meeting  the  requirements  of the  rules  of origin  increases  the  costs.  These  are  huge
amounting-according  to  an  estimate  for  EFTA-European  Community  trade  (Herin  1986)-to  between8
larger  than  that  in  any  of a  single  (or  combined)  SEE-5,  this  arrangement  will offer  strong
advantage  to EU firms at the expense of SEE-5  firms.  It will be  easier for the former to claim
preferences  in access  to SEE-5  markets,  simply because  more inputs  are available  locally,  i.e., in
the EU.  In  contrast,  similar SEE-5  firms are more  likely to rely on imports not necessarily  from
the  EU.  Even though-FTAs  among  SEE-5  countries may  limit the 'hub-and-spoke'  effects,  the
bilateral cumulation  between the EU and each SEE-5  would provide disincentive  to regional trade
in intermnediate  products.
Second, "hub" firms are more likely to have  all necessary  accounting  devices to meet the
necessary  rules-of-origin  requirements  and  not  incur extra administrative  costs."  Because  of a
large network of bilateral free  trade agreements  of which the EU  is a party,  many EU exporters
have  already  incurred  administrative  costs  associated  with  proving  that their products  meet the
requirements  of the rules of origin.  This does not seem  to be the case  for most of 'spoke'  firms
lacking  the  capacity  to  demonstrate  the  geographical  breakdown  of the  inputs  used  in  their
production.  With  customs  procedures  poorly  developed  in  most  SEE-5  countries,  the  EU
customs authorities  may be unwilling to accept their respective proofs of origin.
Third,  "spoke"  countries  in  North-South  integration  scheme  tend  to  specialize  in
unskilled  labor-intensive  products  such  as  textiles,  clothing  and  footwear.  These  'sensitive'
products,  accounting  for  the  bulk  of  SEE-5  exports  to  the  EU,'2 face  much  more  difficult
conditions  in  access  to  markets  in  highly  developed  countries  including  the  EU  than  other
industrial  products  in  which  EU  firms  specialize.  Even  though  the  Europe  Association
Agreements  and the Stabilization  and Association  Agreements that had been so far signed  include
the  removal  of tariffs  and  other  restrictions  on  sensitive  products,  the  rules  for  assessing  their
origination are more complex and more difficult to meet than for other industrial products.  While
for other industrial  products an exporter  has to demonstrate that local processing resulted  in a new
product in terms of "change  in tariff heading," that is,  an imported product is differently classified
than the exported  one, the criteria for sensitive products are different.  Instead of 'change in tariff
heading,'  they are subject to technical  requirements.' 3 These are more difficult to fulfill than the
"change  in tariff heading"  requirement  used for most other products  and they are often used  as a
tool of protection (Hoekman  1993).
three and  five percent of the transaction  value.  Although  under preferential  access granted by the EU  SEE-
5 exporters  already  have to meet the rule-of-origin  requirements  in  order to take  advantage  of preferential
treatment under GSP or ATP, other firms  interacting now solely with non-preferential  markets  will have to
adopt special accounting procedures  to trace origins of each input.
"1  Cost  relates  to  administrative  activities  that  the  'rules  of origin'  impose  on  an  exporter.  Empirical
evidence from intra-EFTA and EFTA-EU  trade show that many exporters  preferred to pay non-preferential
tariff rather than incur costs necessary for qualifying for preferential  treatment (Herin 1986).
12  They accounted in 2000 for between 46% (Croatia) and 70% (Bosnia and Herzegovina)  of their total
EU-oriented  exports (own calculations  from WITS database).
"  Annexes  to  the  Europe  Association  Agreements  specifying  technical  requirements  deal  almost
exclusively  with  footwear,  clothing  and  textiles.  Brenton  and  Manchin  (2002)  note  that  86 percent  of
textile  headings  and  95  percent of clothing  headings  require  satisfying  specific  working  and processing
conditions.  Consider  that  exports  of clothing  have  been  excluded  from  the  scope  of Pan-European
cumulation rules  (Driessen and  Graafsma  1999).  For a more general  discussion  of the rules of origin  and
their impact on trade, see UNCTAD  1998.9
The  combination  of 'hub-and-spoke'  pattern  and  restrictive  rules  of origin  favors  EU
firms  while offering  limited  advantages  to firms  operating  in  SEE-5  economies.  An  important
question, to which we shall now turn, is what, if anything, can be done about it.
Possible Remedies:  Intra-Regional  FTAs,  Diagonal Cumulation  and
Customs  Union
Since potentially negative  effects  resulting in significant  cost advantage  to hub firms are mostly
not structural but policy-induced, the change in policy should improve  the competitive  position of
spoke firms.  Disadvantage of spoke firms due to more limited market access can be addressed by
the  removal  of  trade  barriers  among  spokes  combined  with  the  introduction  of  diagonal
cumulation  across  SEE-5  economies.  Negative  effects  of exporters  from  SEE-5  facing  more
restrictive  rules of origin,  because of their specialization  in products regarded  as  sensitive  in EU
markets,  than those  from the EU can also  be addressed  through change  in policy.  Theoretically,
two options are possible:  first, one might get rid of technical rules and extend the requirement of
change in tariff heading at four-digit combined nomenclature  to sensitive products,  i.e.,  footwear,
textiles  and  clothing;  and  second,  one  might  get rid  of the  need  to  use  the  rules  of origin  by
replacing the free trade component in SAAs (as well as  in FTAs among  SEE-5 countries)  with a
customs  union.  14  These  two  options  would  constitute  radical  change  from the  current policy
stance  and  are thus not explored  further.  Instead,  two alternative  means to  at least  reduce  the
negative  impact of restrictive rules of origin on the "spokes"  are  discussed  in detail below:  the
creation of a "virtual" free trade area in South Eastern Europe, and diagonal cumulation.
Trade  liberalization  efforts  in South  Eastern  Europe  go  beyond  bilateral  integration
between  the  EU  and  each  SEE-5  country,  and trade  liberalization  among  SEE-5  countries.  as
envisaged by the  SA process.  The Memorandum  of Understanding  on Trade  Liberalization  and
Facilitation  (MOU) in  South  Eastern  Europe  (Memo  2001)-signed  by  the governments  of the
SEE-5,  Bulgaria  and Romania  on  June  27, 2001,  in Brussels,  and  subsequently  adopted  by the
government  of  Moldova-extends  trade  liberalization  to  include  all  eight  members  of  the
Stability Pact.  While a major objective of the MOU is to boost regional  stability by triggering  the
process of building trust through intensive commercial interaction,  it will also reduce the potential
negative  impact  of  a  hub-and-spoke  pattern.  The  MOU  in fact  envisaged  the  creation  of  a
"virtual"  free  trade  area  in the region  by establishing  a network  of bilateral  FTAs  between  the
signatory countries."5 The MOU  set the framework  for a network  of FTAs to be established  by
the end of 2002.16
However,  intra-regional  policy-induced  integration  will not start from  scratch as several
countries  that emerged from the collapse  of the former  SFRY had established  bilateral  free trade
14  While without a more  detailed analysis it is  impossible to assess whether benefits of a customs  union to
SEE-5  would prevail over costs,  especially  if agricultural  products  are included,  this would  seem to be a
policy alternative worth exploring.
15  The  Memorandum  requires  that  their trade  policies  vis-a-vis  each  other  meet  three  conditions:  the
removal of quantitative  restrictions  on imports  and exports  together  with export duties or charges  having
the same  effect;  "zeroing"  of tariffs  on at least 90 percent  of the mutual  trade and of Harmonized  System
(HS)  tariff lines by the  end of a maximum  transitional  period of six years;  and abolishment of tariffs  and
other charges on a large  majority preferably  upon entry  into force  of each free trade agreement with those
on sensitive goods within a period of not more than six years (Articles  1.2.1 - 1.2.3,  Memo 2001).
16  The vast majority  of the bilateral FTAs  envisaged  by the MOU have  been  concluded  by end-2002,  as
discussed in  Gressani and Michalopoulos  (2003).10
arrangements  with each  other even before  signing the MOU..  There were  six pre-MOU FTAs in
the region.  FYR Macedonia had made the largest strides in that direction.  Prior to the MOU it
had  FTAs  already  in  effect  with  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  and  FR  Yugoslavia). 7 Former  Yugoslav
republics  have  also  signed or  are  negotiating  FTA with  other  countries  in  Central  and Eastern
Europe.
The  MOU, while a remarkable  political  achievement  in itself,  is only the first step in the
unfolding  dynamics  of a  two-dimensional  process  of intra-regional  integration  and  integration
into the EU.  Two risks that may reduce  gains from trade integration in the framework  of the SA
process loom  large on the horizon.  First, regional  liberalization  may erode incentives  to pursue
multilateral  liberalization  recommended  in  the  MOU  (Article  11).  While  the economic  logic
would  suggest  the reverse,  the  experience  of Central  European  EU  candidates  points  in  other
direction  (see  Kaminski  2001,  Messerlin  1997).  On  economic  grounds,  it  would  seem  the
establishment of free trade in industrial products with the EU would provide a strong incentive to
lowering MFN tariff rates to EU levels.  There would be no fear of adjustment  pains,  as existing
domestic firms having demonstrated their ability to compete with EU firms are likely to withstand
competition from MFN  imports.  The possible  loss in customs revenue would be more than offset
by consumers'  gains thanks to expanded  access to a wider variety of products.  Yet, the shift to
free trade  in  industrial  products between  the EU and Europe  Association  countries has failed  so
far to trigger any  action to align  MFN tariffs on  industrial  products  with those  in the  EU.  The
latter,  however,  is  indispensable  to  offset  negative  effects  of the  hub-and-spoke  pattern  and
maximize gains from both dimensions of regional integration.
Second,  there is a risk that the MOU will be  implemented  in an  inconsistent  and limited
manner,  keeping  markets  fragmented,  denying  SEE-5  firms  economies  of  scale  effects  and
thereby reducing potential FDI inflows.  The decision to follow the track of bilateral FTAs rather
than  establishing  a single  free  trade area  in  a  "big bang,"  as  suggested  by Messerlin  and Maur
(2001),  appears  to  indicate  still  lingering  political  resistance  to the  SEE  dimension  of regional
integration.'
8
In the absence  of strong commitment  to  intra-regional  trade  liberalization  by the  SEE-5
and given the dominance of inter-industry trade,  governments  may turn to the rules  of origin and
contingent protection  to control imports.  Rules of origin not only can lead to trade diversion and
extra  costs for both  authorities  and exporters  but  also to restrictions  in imports.  In  fact,  they are
not only costly but have  been extensively used as protectionist devices (Krueger  1997 and  1999).
Although the MOU requires  development of an "...  appropriate common set of preferential rules
of origin furthering the objectives of this Memorandum,"  (Article 3), a large number of bilateral
overlapping  FTAs does not augur well to meet this objective.  The danger is that different sets of
preferences  over different periods  with varied  product coverage  and  different tariffs  and rules of
origin  will  emerge  in  bilateral  agreements.  This  in  turn  will  further  complicate  customs
''  Until  1999  both  Croatia  and  FRY  had  FTAs  with  entities  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina-Bosnian
Federation  and Republika  Srpska.  These  were revoked  and subsequently  new agreements  with Bosnia  and
Herzegovina  were re-negotiated  in the context of the MOU.  They  all envisage  gradual  removal  of tariffs
by Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  the  immediate  removal  of tariffs  on  imports  originating  in  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina.
18  Economic  literature  on  integration  suggests  that  a  single  regional  trading  area  encompassing  SEE-5
economies  as  well  as  other  members  of Stability  Pact  would  have  been  a superior  economic  solution
provided that MFN  tariff rates  on industrial products  are aligned with the EU (Messerlin 2001).  Lowering
tariff rates would minimize static costs and the creation of a large FTA would maximize dynamic effects.11
administrative tasks and exacerbate  corruption  already  endemic  in several  countries of the region
(World Bank 2000b).
The  possible abuse  of the  provisions of the MOU allowing for contingent  protection-
provided the measures implemented  be consistent  with the WTO rules' 9-may  have a depressing
effect  on  trade  further  fragmenting  markets.  WTO-compatibility  does  little  to  mitigate
protectionism  inherent  in antidumping and other restrictive non-tariff measures.  The crux of the
matter is that contingent protectionism  provides a major barrier to trade, as its mere  existence  has
a "chilling"  effect on trade and undermines  competition  from imports (World Bank 2000a,  p. 80).
For  this  reason,  the  European  Economic  Area  (EU-EFTA),  the  Canada-Chile  FTA  and  the
Australia-New  Zealand FTA do not have provisions allowing for contingent  protection measures.
While the SEE-5 countries  can design their intra-regional  trade liberalization at their own
discretion,  other  measures  reducing  costs  of EU-SEE-5  trade  liberalization--,cumulation  of the
rules  of origin  and  the  rules  of origin  themselves-are  beyond  their  control.  One  important
weakness  of the  SA process  is that  its trade component  envisages  bilateral  cumulation  of origin
between the EU and each respective  SEE-5 country.  From this perspective,  SAAs, once in place,
will establish five separate free trade areas between  the EU and each SEE-5.  Bilateral cumulation
in the network of FTAs creates disincentives to use inputs originating  in separate free trade areas.
It  will  discourage  SEE-5  firms  from  developing  mutual  production  links  oriented  toward
supplying EU markets,  simply because inputs from other SEE-5 countries  are treated as 'external'
imports.  In  consequence,  a  product  may  fail  to  qualify  for  preferential  treatment  in  the  EU
eroding the value of a trade component of the SAAs.
Another consequence  of bilateral cumulation of rules of origin  is that they erect a barrier
to  the development  of trade  based  on  fragmentation  of production,  i.e.,  moving  across  border
various  fragments  of a  supply  chain.  Trade  in  parts  and  components  induced  by production
fragmentation  has been the most dynamic component of international  trade  over the  last decade
(Feenstra  1998,  Yeats  1998).  Bilateral  cumulation  discourages  moving  production  of parts  to
various  SEE-5  as  the  assembled  product  might fail  to  qualify  for  duty-free  entry  into the EU.
These  arrangements  may  thus  prevent  large  multinational  corporations  from  establishing
production networks across SEE-5.
One way to address this problem  would  be replacing  bilateral  cumulation  with diagonal
cumulation  of the rules of origin applying to  at least  SEE-5, and  preferably  to all  signatories of
the MoU.  The same rule could be applied not only to SAAs but also to bilateral FTAs.  After all,
it  would  be  difficult  to  find  a  compelling  reason  why  a  product  assembled  in,  for  instance,
Albania from inputs originating  in other SEE-5  should have duty-free  access  to EU markets and
not to  markets  of other SEE-5  countries.  But solving this problem  is  not within  the purview of
SEE-5  countries:  the  EU  only  can  meaningfully  address  it.  Moreover,  diagonal  cumulation
would  considerably  increase  administrative  burden  on  exporters  as  well  as  on  customs
administrations  of SEE-5  countries.  In  consequence,  without  a detailed  analysis  of situation  in
respective  countries,  it remains  unclear whether  benefits  of diagonal  cumulation  of the rules  of
origin would offset administrative and transaction  costs.
19  The MOU  retains  contingent  protection  with  signatories  agreeing that "...  the  provisions  in the  Free
Trade  Agreements  regarding  the application  of antidumping,  countervailing  and  safeguard  measures,  are
consistent with WTO rules." (Article 4, Memo 2001).12
Conclusion
Although FTAs as well  as other types of regional  agreements  are  usually "second-best"  policies
to  multilateral  liberalization,  the  SA  process  has  the  potential  to  offer  unique  benefits  to  its
participants.  It promises  significant returns to  SEE-5  countries,  but these returns will not come
by default.  The  SA process  offers the opportunity  to anchor  liberal  reforms  and move  quickly
towards "deeper"  integration,  i.e., convergence  to efficiency-enhancing  components of the acquis
communautaire.  The latter however requires  structural reforms extending  to all  aspects of 'state-
market'  interaction.  The resulting improvement  in business  environment  may trigger  increased
investments, both domestic and foreign.
However,  benefits  directly  related  to  trade  are  not as  easily  identified  as  those  arising
from "deeper"  integration.  First, "trade-related"  benefits  would often  be higher under unilateral
NFIN  liberalization.  Consider that the increase in  competition from imports  in domestic markets
would  be  higher  under  MFN  liberalization,  as  improved  access  would  not  be  limited  to
preferential  partners-EU  and Stability  Pact countries.  For the same  reason,  imports  would be
even  cheaper than  under preferential  arrangements,  and-barring  free  trade-customs  revenues
higher.  Second,  authorities  and  exporters  would  not  incur costs  associated  with  the rules  of
origin,  and  domestic producers  would not suffer from  negative  "hub-and-spoke"  effects.  In  all,
welfare gains might be higher.
'Trade-related'  benefits from the cooperation  framework  established  by the Stability Pact
can  be maximized  in two major ways-multilateral  liberalization  and modifications  in the design
of bilateral  FTAs  with  the EU  and  within  the  region.  First,  lowering  MIFN  tariff rates  could
increase  benefits  from  increased  competition  in  domestic  markets  and  reduce  some  negative
effects  of the  hub-and-spoke  pattern.  Given  that the  goal  of SEE-5  is  membership  in  the EU,
lowering  MFN  tariff rates  to  those  applied  by  the  EU  would  level  the  playing  field  for  all
preferential  suppliers  to  conditions  prevailing  in  EU  markets.  As  we  shall  see,  MIFN
liberalization would also increase welfare  gains from other dimensions of regional integration.
However, lowering of MFN tariffs does not have to happen immediately.  While a strong
argument  can  be  made  in  favor of quicker  reduction  in  tariffs than  envisaged  in the  two  SAAs
already concluded,20 reductions of MFN rates could be coordinated  with those envisaged  in trade
components  of SAAs.  The  bottom  line  would  not be  zeroing  of MFN  rates  in  line  with  the
removal  of tariff rates on imports from the EU but only lowering them to the levels of MFN tariff
rates applied by the EU.  The adjustment would thus end once reduced  preferential rates are equal
or  lower than  EU  MFN tariff rates.  Since this  would  involve  reduction  in  applied tariff rates,
there would  be no need  to negotiate  them with WTO  members.  For this reason, often expressed
fears  that  unilateral  liberalization  would  erode  bargaining  position  do  not  seem  to  be  well-
founded.
Second,  intra-trade  liberalization  as envisaged  by the MOU  offers not  only the prospect
of building trust in the region but also increasing potential gains from  liberalization of trade with
the  EU.  However,  in  order  to  achieve  these  gains,  some  policy  design  issues  need  to  be
addressed.  A  'spaghetti  bowl'  of FTAs-term  originally  used  to describe  overlapping  FTAs  in
Latin  America  (Schiff  2002)-that  will  emerge  once  all  bilateral  trade  agreements  are
implemented  may  become  a  barrier  to  mutual  trade.  Two  measures  that  can  be  introduced  to
avoid this outcome  include the removal  of provisions  on contingent protection  along the lines of
20  SAAs  have been  concluded  only with  Croatia and  FYR Macedonia.  Their trade component  envisages
asymmetrical  pace  in removing  tariffs.  The  EU  will  dismantle  all  tariff and  non-tariff  barriers  over  a
shorter period than  SEE-S partners.13
the European Economic Area (EU-EFTA),  and the introduction of simple rules of origin based on
diagonal  cumulation.  In  addition,  as  suggested above,  SEE-5  countries might lower  their MFN
tariffs  at  the  pace  set  in  SAAs  for  the  reduction  of tariffs  on  their  imports  from  the  EU.
Combined with efforts to harmonize  taxes on goods and services  collected at border,  this would
encourage  development  of horizontal  links among  SEE-5  firms  and  weaken  incentives  to trade
deflection  and smuggling.
In  all; trade  liberalization  in  both dimensions-the  European  dimension  and the  intra-
regional  dimension-calls  for a very careful  coordination  of the  pace of liberalization  not only
between  these  two  dimensions,  but also  with  multilateral  liberalization.  MIFN  liberalization,
liberalization  in trade  with the EU  and  in  that with other  SEE  countries should  be  regarded  as
components  of integration  into  global  markets.  The  remainder  of this  paper  seeks  to  identify
measures  along these  three dimensions  of integration  into global  markets  that offer the greatest
potential for gains to SEE-5 countries.
3.  DANGERS  OF  INTRA-REGIONAL  LIBERALIZATION:  SEE-5  FTAs
Benefits  from FTA depend  on  who is  integrating  with whom.  Taking  into account the level  of
economic  development,  two cases  are  relevant for this discussion-North-South  integration and
South-South  integration.  Integration  into the EU is the case of North-South  integration,  whereas
SEE-5  intra-regional  integration  falls into the South-South integration,  albeit  among countries at
different  levels  of economic  development  and  dependence  on  foreign  markets.  The  former
involves  integration  between  highly developed  countries  and developing  countries,  whereas  the
latter concems  integration  arrangements  among developing  countries.  Providing that integration
goes beyond trade, benefits to a 'South' country  integrating into a 'North'  country are huge, as it
pushes the former to become like the latter.
Institutional  convergence  improves  investment  climate  and  boosts  investments.  The
empirical  evidence-supported  now  by theoretical  economic  geography  models-suggests  that
EU integration has led to an almost continuous convergence  in income per capita among member
countries  (World  Bank  2000a).  As a rule, poorer  members of the  EU have  experienced  faster
economic  growth  and  caught  up with  the  most developed  ones  as  a  result of policy-induced
integration.  The  theoretical  explanation  of this  phenomenon  is  that if a country  with capital  to
labor endowment below the world average  integrates with a country with the ratio  exceeding the
world average, the former country experiences acceleration  in industrialization.
On the other hand, benefits from  'South-South'  integration are problematic  depending  on
the  design of a  regional  trade arrangement.  No convergence  in  income per capita  occurs  in the
case of policy-induced  integration  among  less developed  countries.  In  fact, when two  countries
involved  in regional  integration  have capital to  labor endowments  below the world averages,  the
one with a higher average expands  at the expense of a less developed  partner.  The scope of this
effect  depends  on  the  level  of preferential  tariff margins-high  extemal  tariffs  exacerbate  the
move  of  manufacturing  production  out  of a  less  developed  to  a  more  developed  "Southern"
country.  Ultimately,  the  extent  of divergence  depends  also  on  the  level  of preferential  tariff
margins;  the  higher  they are  the  more pronounced  relocation  of economic  activity  to  a  more
developed partner  is.  In fact,  the empirical  evidence  from the  South-South  integration  provides14
strong support to the finding that integration  among developing countries  leads to divergence in
economic performance. 2'
Although  the  unique  feature  of trade  liberalization  in  the  SA  framework  is  that  it
simultaneously  embraces  both  a  European  and an  intra-regional  dimension,  interesting  insights
can  be gained  by focusing  on  SEE-5  intra-regional  trade liberalization.  In  fact,  these  insights
reinforce  the  earlier  conclusion  that  the  simultaneous  pursuit  of  liberalization  in  its  three
dimensions-multilateral,  European  and intra-regional-would  maximize  economic gains for the
SEE-5  countries.  Moreover,  ill-designed  SEE-5  FTAs  may  bring  about greater  harm than  the
earlier discussed negative effects of the hub-and-spoke  pattem.
*  There  are  arguments  suggesting  that  regional  integration  moving  much  faster  than
European  integration  would  not  make  economic  sense,  as  it  would  lead  to  divergence  in
economic growth.  Although  SEE-5  is a very heterogeneous  region, not a single country  qualifies
as high-income  economy.  Croatia, the most  developed  among  SEE-5  economies,  with the  GDP
per capita at around  30 percent of the average EU level has capital/labor ratio well below the EU
average.  In consequence,  it may not have comparative  advantage  in most industrial products in
world  markets.  But many  of its products  may become  highly  competitive  within  a SEE-5  free
trade  area.  Simultaneously Croatia has the GDP per capita around four times higher than that of
Albania  and  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  around  three-times  as  high  as  in remaining  SEE-5
economies.  Its total  GDP of US$20  billion  accounts  for 40  percent  of the aggregate  region's
GDP (Table 1).
Table 1: Population and GDP  in SEE-5 in 1999
Population  Share  GDP  Share  GDP per  Croatia  Trade as % of
(in  million)  in  total  (mil. of US$)  in  total  capita  =100  GDP"
(in  US$)
Albania  3.4  14%  3,665  8%  1,102  25  52% (63%)
Bosnia and  4.2  17%  4,387  10%  1,027  23  77% (95%)
Herzegovina
Croatia  4.5  18%  20,211  46%  4,467  100  114% (143%)
FYR Macedonia  2.0  8%  3,401  8%  1,701  38  82% (99%)
FR Yugoslavia  10.5  43%  12,020  28%  1,562 (98)  35  52%
Kosovo  1.6  7%  1,562  3%  868  18  85%
Montenegro  0.8  3%
TOTAL  24.5  100%  51,033  100%  2,017  42  58%
Memorando
Bulgaria  8.2  12,403  1,513  34  150% (176%)
Romania  22.5  34,027  1,512  34  107% (116%)
GRAND TOTAL  55.2  97,463  1,766  40
"Including  services in  parentheses.
Source: World Development Indicators  2001, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 2001,  Michalopoulos  and
Panousopoulos (2002) and World Bank and IMF staff estimates.
While  GDP  per  capita  alone  may  not fully  capture  the  diversity  in the  levels  of their
economic development,  other indicators corroborate  this diversity.  Despite similar levels  of the
GDP in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina,  agriculture generated  53 percent of the GDP in the
21  A  number of FTAs  among developing countries  in  Africa were terminated because of benefits  accruing
to a more developed partner at the expense of a less developed  one (World Bank.2000b).15
former  and  only  15  percent  in  the  latter  (Table  2).  On  the  other  hand,  differences  between
Croatia and  FYR Macedonia  in  terms of the composition  of GDP are much smaller  despite huge
discrepancies  in GDP per capita.
Table 2: Composition of GDP  in SEE-5 countries in 1999
Bosnia and  FYR  FR
Albania  Herzegovina  Croatia  Macedonia  Yugoslavia
Agriculture  52.6  14.5  8.5  9.2  18.1
Industry  11.9  22.1  20.4  21.5  38.9"
Services, of which  35.5  63.4  71.1  69.2  43.0
Construction  13.5  6.7  6.7  6.3
Transportation  and communication  3.2  8.0  9.2  7.2
Other services  18.8  48.7  55.2  55.7
iincludes construction.
Sources:  Albania,  FYR Macedonia,  and Croatia-IMF  data;  Bosnia and Herzegovina-National  Office  of
Statistics;  FR Yugoslavia-Economic  Survey of Europe, No.  1.,  United Nations  Economic Commission  for
Europe, Geneva 2001.
Heterogeneity  in  economic  development  combined  with  the  fact  that  even  its  most
developed  economy  is well  below  the level of a  least developed  EU member raises the risk that
intra-regional  integration  will lead to relocation of industrial  activity to Croatia at the expense  of
poorer members  in the regional  FTA.  If this were  to happen,  there would  be a danger that  de-
industrialization  pressure  in  some  countries  would  exacerbate  rather  than  relieve  regional
tensions.
The case of intra-regional  liberalization without concurrent  integration  into the EU and/or
multilateral trade liberalization  falls into the South-South  framework with all  its potential pitfalls.
This applies only to SEE-5  preferential  trade arrangements,  as other MoU  signatories-Bulgaria
and Romania-are  already part of a single European  market for manufactures  fully in place  since
January  1, 2002.  Duty-free  access  of firms  from  the  EU,  EFTA,  CEFTA  and  a host  of other
countries effectively wipes away potential distortions inflicted  by a South-South  FTA. For SEE-5
economies, however,  liberalization  in intra-regional  trade would  lead to a South-South trap unless
they significantly reduce  MFN tariff rates and open to  EU imports  at a similar pace  as  to those
from other preferential partners within the region.
One  should  also  note  that  the  South  East  European  region  is  rather  small  in  both
economic  and  population  terms,  which  has  potentially  negative  welfare  implications.  The
aggregate  GDP  of US$50  billion  amounts  to  around  40  percent  of the  GDP  of Greece.  It is
merely 2.5 times larger than that of a small former Yugoslav republic of Slovenia while their total
foreign  trade  tumover  of  about  US$30  billion  is  lower  than  that  of  Slovenia.  Inclusion  of
Bulgaria and Romania-two countries already on a different track of pan-European  integration-
does not significantly alter the picture.  The combined  size of the region in terms of GDP  is still
well below that of the Greek economy.  The danger  inherent  in the small  size is  significant from
the point of view of preferential trade arrangements.  The empirical  evidence  suggests that FTA
among  small  economies  usually lead  to welfare losses  as they result in trade  diversion and  little
trade creation.16
Should then regional  trade liberalization  among  SEE-5  economies  be a policy priority?
If this  were  the  only  dimension  of trade  liberalization  being  pursued,  the  answer  would  be
unequivocally  negative  unless accompanied  by strong MFN liberalization.
This  analysis  points  to  the  importance  of designing  the  pace  of SEE-5  mutual  trade
liberalization in ways that would both reduce  incentives  to shift  industrial  activity from poorer to
richer countries of the region and to trade diversion due to SEE-5  small economic size.  Openness
to the external world is the best solution to both negative outcomes, as  it scales down preferential
margins enjoyed by SEE-5 producers  in SEE-5 markets.  Low MFN tariff rates  lessen the level of
protection  given  to firms  including  those  from  more  developed  SEE-5  countries.  So  do  lower
preferential  tariff rates on imports from the EU.
Hence,  two  practical  policy recommendations  follow from  this analysis.  First,  the time
during  which  firms  from  SEE-5  and  other  MoU  signatories  would  enjoy  preferential  tariff
margins  over suppliers  from the EU should  be shortened.  This  would suggest  a faster reduction
of tariff rates  on  imports  from  the EU.  Second,  high  MFN tariff rates  on industrial  products
should be significantly  lowered with the entry in force of FTAs.  This  would reduce  the level of
protection  accorded  to SEE-5  firms that may  be competitive  in other regional markets  thanks  to
high tariffs.
4.  INTRA-SEE-5  TRADE:  POTENTIAL  FOR GROWTH  AND IMPLICATIONS  FOR
FTA
Developments  in intra-SEE-5  trade,  its  composition  and the  extent to which  this trade  remains
below  its potential  because  of the  legacy  of political  tensions are  relevant  for  an  assessment  of
FTAs among  SEE-5  economies.  Will the proliferation  of FTAs elicit strong trade response from
new participants?  What is the potential  for the increase in trade among countries some of which
were part of the same state only a decade ago?  These are among main questions addressed in this
section.
Geographical  proximity,  the  size of economies  entering  into the  FTA  and  the  level  of
trade  among  them  influence  the  balance  between  benefits  and  costs  to  its  participants.  If
countries  entering an agreement  are  closely  located  and already  have significant  trade turnover,
i.e.,  they  are  'natural'  trading partners,  then  positive  effects are  likely to  exceed  negative  ones.
Similar positive  effects  would  seem  to prevail  if mutual  trade,  despite  geographical  proximity,
was suppressed for non-economic  reasons, as was the case of several former Yugoslav  republics.
What is the current potential  for the expansion  of this trade?  In other words, the question
is whether  SEE-countries  under-trade  among  themselves.  Because  of the  inherited  distortions
and  the  low  quality  of available trade  data,  there  is  no  single  method to  obtain  an unequivocal
answer  to  this  question.  Consider  first  the  available  data.  As  can  be  seen  from  Table  3
comparing  SEE-5  export statistics  with  mirror statistics  for the same flows, differences  between
the values of exports to other SEE-5 countries and corresponding  imports from these countries are
huge.  They  are  well  over  10-15  percent  usually  regarded  as  reflecting  differences  in  counting
respective  values of exports  and  imports.  Differences  in valuations  or the standard  inclusion  in
the value  of imports of cost,  insurance  and freight  cannot  explain  them.  These  usually do  not
account  for more  than  ten percent.  Moreover,  the  values of exports  should  be lower  than  the
value  of corresponding  imports.  Except for Albania  and  Croatia  (see corresponding  columns  in
Table  3), the values of export to  import indices  are significantly  larger than unity.  While  this is
the case of all other SEE-S, these values  are particularly high for FR Yugoslavia.  As can be seen17
from  the  last  column  of Table  3,  FR  Yugoslavia  import  statistics  tended  to  give  much  lower
values  of  imports  than  respective  exporters.  For  instance,  the  value  of Albania's  exports  to
FR Yugoslavia  was four times  larger than the value of FR Yugoslavia imports from  Albania;  the
values of Croatia and  FYR  Macedonia  exports to FR Yugoslavia  were  more than  twice  larger
than the values of imports from Croatia and FYR Macedonia  as reported in FR Yugoslavia trade
statistics.
Table 3: Ratio of exports reported  by exporter (rows) to these exports as reported  by unporter  in 2000 (in
percent)
From/to  Albania  Bosnia and  Croatia  FYR  FR
Herzegovina'  Macedonia  Yugoslavia
Albania  x  0%  0%  167%  400%
Bosnia and  0%  x  93%  172%  117%
Herzegovina
Croatia  92%  118%  X  104%  249%
FYR Macedonia  60%  136%  87%  x  256%
FR Yugoslavia  30%  132%  61%  111%  x
Sources: Albania:  IMF; Bosnia and Herzegovina:  National Statistics and IMF; Croatia: National  Statistics;
FYR Macedonia:  National  Statistics; FR Yugoslavia:  National Statistics.
Since  no  border  charges  are  levied  on  exports  from  SEE-5,  there  is  little  reason  for
exporters to circumvent  border controls.  For importers,  however, there is incentive  to 'convince'
customs officials not to register imports especially  strong in the presence of high levels  of tariffs,
sales tax and  excise tax rates.22 By this measure,  it would  be tempting to conclude that Albania
and  Croatia  emerge  as  countries  with  relatively  low  levels  of the  incidence  of  corruption  in
customs  administration,  whereas  customs  administrations  in other SEE-5  countries  do  not pass
this test.  This may be the case. But the fact that FR Yugoslavia controls economic border only of
Serbia  may  lead  to  discrepancies,  as  statistics  may  report  exports  destined  to  Montenegro  or
Kosovo  as  exports  to  FR Yugoslavia  whereas  these  are  beyond  the  reach  of FR Yugoslavia
customs.
Another  source of distortion with potentially  significant impact on the pattern  of trade is
that  for the  better  part  of the  1990s,  that  is,  until  the  EU  extended  the  new  set  of ATPs  to
FR Yugoslavia  on November  1, 2000,  FR Yugoslavia's  trade  with highly developed  economies
was  subject  to  severe  restrictions  and  economic  sanctions.  In  consequence,  FR  Yugoslavia
diverted  its trade to the region.23 Its  trade  in 2000, the  latest year  for which trade  statistics  are
available,  with  other  SEE-S  countries  was  much  higher than  it would  have  been  the  case  had
FR Yugoslavia had access to EU markets.
Leaving aside the low quality of trade statistics  in most SEE-5  countries,  the problem  is
also that  some  portion  of it  goes  unreported.  Different  and  high  excise  tax  rates  and  tariffs
certainly  provide  powerful  incentives  to  smuggling.  But this  is  not the only reason  suggesting
that  reported  trade  flows  are  lower  than  the  actual  ones.  Other  reasons  may  stem  from  the
22  Mirror statistics do not allow capturing the scope of smuggling  activities,  as neither customs  services of
an  originating country nor those  in the country of destination  report them.  Hence, the difference  between
the corresponding values of trade flows cannot be explained by smuggling.
23  As Christie  (2001,  p.  14) notes,  foreign  trade of FR Yugoslavia  "...  displays  a very irregular  pattern,
with massive redirecting of trade to specific 'friendly  partners'."18
unwillingness  to  report  (e.g.,  trade  between  the  two  entities  of Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and
Croatia  and  FR Yugoslavia),  the  absence  of border  points  (e.g.,  between  Kosovo  and  Serbia
until  2001),  and trade going through  'no man's  land'  (e.g.,  through the Brcko area,  which  is not
part of any of two entities constituting Bosnia  and Herzegovina-).  Some of these reasons might
have  disappeared  with the improvement  in cooperation  among  SEE  countries,  but these are not
necessarily  captured by the latest available  statistics for 2000.  In all,  while it is anybody's  guess
how  large  unrecorded  trade  is, the  point  is that  actual  trade  is  larger than  reported  in available
statistics.
Considering  all these limitations,  we  shall  resort to a variety of approaches  including a
very simple variant of a  gravity analysis.  The overall conclusion  from the analysis  of historical
and  current  trade  flows,  gravity  estimates,  the  composition  of this  trade,  and  comparative
assessment  of trade  flows  among  founding  members  of CEFTA  and  former  Soviet  republics
suggest  that the  potential  for  the expansion  of intra-SEE-5  trade  within the  existing productive
structures  is rather limited.
Intra-SEE-5  Trade:  Geographic Pattern
Intra-SEE-5  geographic  pattern of trade displays three interesting features (Table 4).  First, this is
a more  important market for SEE-exporters  taking  up around one-fifth  of their total exports than
for their  imports accounting  only for  less-than  10  percent of their aggregate  imports.  The  point
worth  noting  is  that the  value of total  exports of goods amounted  to  around  50  percent  of the
value of total imports in  2000.
Second,  the  significance  of intra-SEE-5  trade  varies  considerably  across  countries.  On
the  import  side,  shipments  from  SEE-S  suppliers  accounted  in  2000  for  22  percent  of total
imports  of Bosnia and Herzegovina,  12  percent of FYR Macedonia's  imports, but only 2 percent
of Croatian  and 3 percent of total  imports of Albania.  On the export side, excluding Albania the
variation  for other  SEE-S  economies  is low  with the shares  ranging  from  15  percent  (Croatia),
21  percent  (FR  Yugoslavia),  26  percent  (FYR  Macedonia)  and  28  percent  (Bosnia  and
Herzegovina).
Third,  geographical  SEE-trade  patterns  reflect  to  a large  extent the  legacy of conflicts
accompanying the dissolution of the former  SFRY.  The  legacy of the Croat-Serb  conflict seems
still to  shape  trade  flows.  Links  between  Croatia  and  Serbia,  the  two  largest  countries  of the
former SFRY, while previously extensive, were mainly broken by the war of the 1990s and never
restored.  Despite  common  borders,  trade  between  Croatia  and  FR  Yugoslavia  remains
minuscule.  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  seems  to  defy  this pattern  but  only  in  aggregate  country
statistics.  In fact, large  flows of trade with both Croatia and FR Yugoslavia occur at the level  of
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  two  entities.  Trade  with  Croatia  is still  limited  to the  Federation  of
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  whereas  that  with  FR  Yugoslavia  concerns  flows  in  and  out  of
Republika  Srpska.  On  the other hand, FYR Macedonia,  which  succeeded  in staying  outside the
regional  conflicts of the 1990s, has relatively  significant trade with  all other SEE-S  countries.19
Table 4: Regional Trade in Southeast Europe in 2000 (in million of US dollars and  percent)
Imports (2000)  Albania  Bosnia and  Croatia  FYR  FR  Total SEE-5
Herzegovina  Macedonia  Yugoslavia
(Millions of US$)  Amount  %  Amount  %  Amount  %  Amount %  Amount  %  Amount  %
Total imports  1,063  100  2,893  100  7,922  100  2,084  - 3,710  100  17,672  100
Imports from:
Albania  - - 0  0.0  0.4  0.0  3  0.1  1  0.0  5  0.0
Bosnia and  0  0.0  - - 82  1.0  5  0.2  174  4.7  261  1.5
Herzegovina
Croatia  11  1.0  418  14.4  - - 57  2.7  43  1.2  530  3.0
FYR Macedonia  21  2.0  17  0.6  55  0.7  - - 130  3.5  222  1.3
FR Yugoslavia  1  0.1  193  6.7  31  0.4  190  9.1  - - 414  2.3
SEE-5  33  3.1  628  21.7  168  2.13  255  12.2  348  9.4  1,432  8.1
EU: of which  817  76.9  4,405  55.6  749  35.9  5,971  33.8
Greece  281  26.4  24  0.8  20  0.2  200  9.6  132  3.6  656  3.7
Bulgaria  26  2.4  10  0.3  7  0.1  97  4.7  324  8.7  464  2.6
Romania  11  1.0  14  0.5  19  0.2  16  0.8  145  3.9  205  1.2
TOTAL BALKAN  351  33.0  676  23.3  214  2.6  568  27.3  949  25.6  2,757  15.6
Exports  (2000)  Albania  Bosnia and  Croatia  FYR  FR  Total SEE-5
Herzegovina  Macedonia  Yugoslavia
(Millions of US$)  Amount  %  Amount %  Amount  %  Amount  %  Amount  %  Amount  %
Total exports  281  100  1,028  100  4,431  100  1,617  100  1,722  100  9,079  100
Exports to:
Albania  - - 0  0.0  10.1  0.2  12.6  0.8  0.3  0.0  23  0.3
Bosnia and  0  0.0  - - 495  11.2  23.1  1.4  254  14.8  772  8.5
Herzegovina
Croatia  0  0.0  76  7.4  - - 47.6  2.9  19  1.1  143  1.6
FYR Macedonia  5  0.5  9  0.8  59  1.3  - - 210  12.2  283  3.1
FR Yugoslavia  4  0.4  204  19.8  107  2.4  333  16.0  - - 648  7.1
SEE-5  9  0.8  289  28.1  671  15.1  416  21.1  483  28.1  1,869  20.6
EU: of which  261  24.6  2,415  54.5  561  34.7  657  38.2  3,237  35.7
Greece  45  16.0  10  1.0  89  2.0  84  5.2  75  4.4  303  3.3
Bulgaria  0  0.0  0  0.0  4  0.1  27  1.7  23  1.3  54  0.6
Romania  0  0.0  10  1.0  3  0.1  2  0.1  23  1.3  38  0.4
TOTAL BALKAN  54  16.9  309  30  767  17.3  529  28.1  604  35.1  2,264  24.9
Sources: Albania:  IMF; Bosnia and Herzegovina:  National Statistics and IMF; Croatia:  National Statistics;
FYR Macedonia:  National Statistics; FR Yugoslavia: National  Statistics.
Last but not least, there are reasons to believe that trade among SEE-5, especially among
former Yugoslav republics, is seriously underestimated.  For starters, consider that trade statistics
of FR  Yugoslavia  do  not  include  foreign  trade  transactions  of independent  customs  areas-
Montenegro  and  Kosovo.  While  we  have  no  data  for  Montenegro,  we  have  an  estimate  of
Kosovo's total  commercial  imports in 2000 of around US$500 million24. This estimate does not
include trade with  Serbia,  as  it went unreported.  Nor does it include  products  transiting through
24  This estimate  is derived  from the customs duty revenues  (10 percent  of the value of imports)  corrected
by the  share of imports through Montenegro  (derived  from the share of customs duty revenue collected  at
Tax Collection Point at the Montenegrin boundary of Kosovo).20
Serbia.  Furthermore, imports entering Bosnia and Herzegovina through the Brcko region, which
is  neither  a  part  of the  Federation  of Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  nor  of Republika  Srpska,  go
unreported.  Reportedly,  these are quite significant,  as excise and  sales tax levied there are lower
than  in two entities  of Bosnia  and Herzegovina.  Furthermore,  high taxation of trade across the
region encourages  black market activities (EWI 2000), which  in turn provides strong incentive to
smuggling.  Porous  borders  in  many  countries,  the  absence  of  language  barrier  in  former
Yugoslav  republics and corrupt customs suggest that unreported trade among SEE-5  may be quite
considerable.  Again,  there  are  no  reliable  estimates,  but  anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that
25 smuggling  is rampant in many areas.
Bringing into the picture other Balkan economies-Bulgaria,  Greece and Romania-does
not significantly  increase the importance of the region as a market for SEE-5  sales and purchases.
These three Balkan  economies  absorbed  merely 4.3  percent of exports  originating  in SEE-5, but
accounted  for 7.5  percent of SEE-5 total  imports.  Geographical  proximity and much higher level
of economic development  seem to explain  a very significant  share of Greece  in Albania's trade,
and  Slovenia's  in  trade of Bosnia  and Herzegovina  and Croatia.26 Common borders  and decent
transportation  network account  for a relatively  large  share of Bulgaria in trade of FR Yugoslavia
and FYR Macedonia.  On the other hand, however, Romania's  involvement in  intra-Balkan trade
remains exceptionally low.
Is Intra-Regional  Trade  below Potential? Gravity Model  Estimates
The  gravity  model  provides  a  useful  tool  to  assess  regional  biases  in  international  trade  and
predict  potential  trade  flows.  It  is  based  on the  concept  borrowed  from  physics  according  to
which  the  gravity  force  is  directly  proportional  to  the  mass  of  two  bodies  and  inversely
proportional  to  the  distance  between  them.  In  a  similar  way,  the  gravity  model  or  equation
describes a bilateral trade  flow as positively  related to the economic  size of the two countries and
negatively  related to the  distance  between  them.  Its results are  highly sensitive to the choice  of
variables  capturing  broadly  conceived  distance  (transport  cost,  cultural  similarities,  language,
etc.), the  economic  size of countries  (the  quality of statistics  on  GDP) as  well as characteristics
concerning consumers'  preferences (or their absence) among the various trading partners.27
25  For instance, the  WSJE reported massive  exports from  Serbia to Kosovo brokered  by Muslim  Slavs  of
Sandzak  involving  food  and  livestock  and  construction  materials.  All  transactions  are  on  cash  basis.
Anecdotal  evidence  about the dramatic increase  in  the number of trucks registered  in Sandzak  to transport
products  to Kosovo  suggests a significant  scope  of this trade  (Robert  Block,  "'Bosniaks'  Dare to  Deliver
Where Many Fear to Go,"  The Wall Street Journal  Europe, 18 February 2000).
26  If one includes  Slovenia, a republic of former Yugoslavia,  the share of the Balkan region in total SEE-5
imports  increases to 23 percent and the share in exports to  31  percent.  Within the  former Yugoslav  space,
the  most  active  trade  occurs  in  the  triangle:  Slovenia-Croatia-Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  accounting  for
71  percent of all shipments among former Yugoslav republics and the share of Croatia and Slovenia in total
exports originating  in former Yugoslav  republics  is 76 percent.  Considering their economic  weight, this is
not surprising.  But clearly there is potential for the increase especially  in trade with FRY.
27  For an illuminating  discussion of the theory underpinning  gravity models and their various applications,
see  Smarzynska,  2001.  For a much  more  elaborate  application  of a gravity model to  estimate  potential
trade  in  SEE  region,  see  Christie  (2001).  It is  interesting  to  note  that the  results  reported  there  do  not
significantly differ from ours.21
Because of the poor quality of data,28 we  use a very simple gravity equation taken  from
Frankel, Stein and Wei (1997) that uses standard parameter values:
liogii  7)  O71gGP~_G  )  0 3 log(GDPPC:  GDP.PC:)  0.71log(D  istance  )
where:  T,j  represents  a trade  flow  from  country  i to country j;  GDP  stands  for the total
Gross  Domestic  Product and GDPPC  for the Gross  Domestic Product  per capita;
Distanceij  denotes the distance between  capital cities of trading partners.
The model  is resolved simultaneously for all countries by inputting the data for each  country and
solving  the equation  above.  The  predicted  trade  is  then compared  to the actual  trade between
dyads of countries.
The results of the 'gravity'  exercise  should  be treated  with extreme caution for two main
reasons.  First, as discussed above, official statistics tend to underreport  existing trade flows.  The
problem  in  SEE-5  goes  beyond  possible sloppiness  or corrupt  practices  at intemational  borders
rather  common  in  many  developing  countries.  The  problem  is  that  trade  statistics  of  FR
Yugoslavia did not include foreign trade transactions of independent customs areas-Montenegro
and Kosovo.  Neitherdid they include  its FR Yugoslavia's  trade with  Serbia nor imports entering
Bosnia  and Herzegovina  through the  Brcko region,  which  is  neither a part of the Federation  of
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  nor Republika  Srpska.  In  consequence,  the  realization  ratios  tend to
over-estimate trade potential, simply because actual trade is underreported.
Second,  the  gravity  model  used  here tends  to  exaggerate  potential  trade  flows  for yet
another  reason.  Consider  that  distance  is  proxy  for  shipping  costs.  But  proximity  does  not
always  reduce  the  transportation  costs,  time  lags,  the  magnitude  of spoilage  or  the  cost  of
gathering  information about the partner's legal and administrative  procedures.  Although  countries
located close to each  other are more likely to have a  long history of bilateral trade giving them a
better  understanding  of  each  other'  customs  and  tastes,  poor  infrastructure  in  most  SEE-5
countries  (i.e.,  ports,  transportation  routes)  seems to  be  a formidable  barrier  to  regional  trade.
Albania,  for  instance,  does  not  have  good  transportation  routes  to  most  of Balkan  countries
excluding Greece.
For reasons  related to the legacy of recent history,  we initially focus on former Yugoslav
republics.  These  countries  had  close ties  as  parts of the  same  national  economy.  As  pointed
earlier,  some observers  believe  that the removal  of trade  barriers among  them  would provide  a
powerful  boost  to  economic  growth  and  regional  cooperation.  Our  calculations  include
Slovenia-although  not a Balkan  country,  it was part of former SFRY.  It had  been not  only a
gateway of former SFRY to the EU, with most of its exports to EU and EFTA markets originating
in  Slovenia,  but also  a  significant  market  for  products  from  other  republics  especially  from
Croatia.29
28  For instance, significantly different data are reported for the same bilateral trade flow between importing
and  exporting  countries.  Discrepancies  in  trade  statistics  are  often  huge  (see  Table  4).  In  order  to
circumvent  this  problem,  we  use-following  the  approach  taken  by Fontagne,  Freduenberg  and  Peridy
(I 999)-the weighted  average of two estimates weighing the imports  as twice  high as those reported  by the
exporting country.
29  Before the split, Slovenia's  trade relations  with the other former Yugoslav republics were quite  intense,
especially  with  Croatia  accounting  in  1990  to roughly one-eight  of its total sales  and purchases.  Around
half of Slovenia's trade turnover with Yugoslav republics was with Croatia (OECD  1997).22
The results  calculated  for 2000  do  not appear to suggest  large  potential  for an  increase
in intra-former  Yugoslav  republic  trade,  albeit with  a caveat.  There  is  significant variation  in
bilateral trade flows projected  by gravity  model for regional  dyads due to lingering  memories  of
animosities,  Western  embargo  on  FR  Yugoslavia  under  the  Milosevic  regime  and  external
assistance.  Taken  together,  they  continue  distorting  trade  flows  among  former  Yugoslav
republics.  As the case of Slovenia's trade demonstrates-the  only former Yugoslav  republic that
succeeded  to  stay  out of regional  upheavals-they  have  had  profound  impact  on trade  flows.
Slovenia's  trade  with  former  Yugoslav  republics  is  close  to  its  predicted  potential.30 The
Croatian-Serb  conflict, which was one of factors contributing to the demise of former SFRY, still
looms large over their trade.  Croatia's trade with FR Yugoslavia remains  well below  its potential
(80%  below  the  predicted  level  in  2000).  On  the  other  hand,  circumstances  unique  to  the
emergence  of Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  have  shaped  its  trade  patterns.  As  expected,  special
relationships  between  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina's  entities,  the  Federation  of  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina  and Republika  Srpska,  with Croatia and FR Yugoslavia,  respectively  contributed to
significant  "over-trade"  with  both  Croatia  (56  percent  above  predicted  trade  level)  and  FR
Yugoslavia (29 percent above predicted).  Another factor  contributing to Bosnia and Herzegovina
'excessive' trade with respectively Croatia, FR Yugoslavia and Slovenia is that foreign assistance
funded most of its imports.  GDP used in generating predicted  flows does not include foreign aid.
Imports were therefore  well above the levels predicted  by the gravity model.  Last but not least,
Western embargo  on trade with FR Yugoslavia appears  to be responsible for its actual trade with
FYR Macedonia exceeding by 42 percent the level predicted  by economic factors alone including
transportation  costs.  Close political  relations free of ethnic tensions,  created a fertile ground  for
diverting FR Yugoslavia's trade to other partners.
Except for bilateral trade between  Croatia  and FR Yugoslavia, there does not seem to be
much potential  for growth resulting from the removal of existing trade barriers.  While some trade
may  pick  up  (e.g.,  as  noted  above,  Croatia's  with  FR  Yugoslavia),  trade  triggered  by  either
Western  assistance  (Bosnia  and  Herzegovina)  or  Western  embargo  on  FR  Yugoslavia  may
actually  fall  with  full  normalization  of  external  economic  relations  in  the  region.  These
developments  will probably  suppress  FR Yugoslavia's  'over-trade'  with FYR Macedonia  at the
expense  of the  growth  in  trade  with  the  EU,  Croatia  and  other  partners  with whom  political
considerations  were responsible for the low levels  in trade. As we discuss in the next section, the
international  experience  corroborates the  expectation that intra-former Yugoslav  republic trade is
unlikely to trigger economic growth  in the region.
The  inclusion  of Albania  changes  the  overall  picture  in  terms  of the  'gravity  model'
results.  If one  includes  Albania,  the aggregate  intra-SEE-5  trade in  2000  remains  roughly  the
same increasing US$34 million from US$1,549 million to US$1,583  million or merely 2 percent.
But the predicted trade increases  rather dramatically from US$1.9  billion to US$2.7  billion or 43
percent.  In  consequence,  the  ratio  of actual  intra-SEE-5  trade to potential  trade  falls  from  82
percent to 57 percent indicating the potential for growth of 70 percent rather than 22 percent  as in
the case excluding Albania.3'  Considering that Albania pursued  autarchic policy of national self-
30 The actual  level of Slovenia's trade with other former Yugoslav republics of US$1.8 billion was only 14
percent lower than the predicted value of US$2.1  billion.
31  Its trade in relation to the GDP,  one of the major gravity model variable,  is well below  levels for other
countries  with a similar GDP per capita-almost 40 percent lower in relative terms than that of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  This  contributes  to  much  higher predicted  levels  of trade  than  the  actual  ones.  Albania's
major export following the collapse  of communism  was labor force.  Remittances  were the major source of
financing  imports  and domestic  consumption.  In consequence,  the  incentive  to  look  for  outside  markets
was somewhat diminished. For more see the country study on Albania in this volume.23
sufficiency  throughout  most  of  its  period  under  central  planning  and  had  virtually  no
transportation  and commercial  linkages  with former  SFRY, the result does not come as surprise.
In  fact,  as  long  as  there  is  no  adequate  transportation  infrastructure  in  place,  the  expansion  in
Albania's trade with other SEE-5 economies  is unlikely to occur.
Turning to other regional partners, our estimates of potential trade flows derived from the
gravity model  show  that trade  flows  between  SEE-5  economies  and other Balkan  countries  are
well below the  predicted  levels.  The exception  is Albania's trade with Greece.  It appears that a
large presence of Albanian expatriates  in Greece  combined with much better transportation  access
than to other Balkan countries  explain why  its trade with Albania  was only  36 percent below  its
potential level.  Romania is at the other extreme.  Assessed against its  GDP and proximity, trade
of Romania with the region  is particularly low  indicating potential  for an almost tenfold increase
once  barriers  to trade  are removed.  Bulgaria and Greece  are  more  involved  in trade with  SEE-5
countries  but their respective  ratios of actual  to potential  trade (29 and 34  percent)  also  indicate
the potential for a hefty threefold  increase (Table 5).
Table 5: Realization Ratios in Geographic Patterns of Trade (in percent)"
Albania  Bosnia and  Croatia  FYR  FR  Total with
Herzegovina  Macedonia  Yugoslavia  SEE-5.
Albania  4
Bosnia and  Herzegovina  0  - 102
Croatia  4  156  - 53
FYR Macedonia  11  15  39  - 58
FR Yugoslavia  1  129  18  142  - 65
Total SEE-5  4  102  53  58  65  57
Greece  64  7  12  49  26  29
Bulgaria  12  5  3  41  84  34
Romania  4  14  4  6  32  13
Total  21  54  28  46  52  35
MEMORANDUM:
Slovenia  3  152  113  58  10  86
Total, Slovenia  included  19  69  48  48  46  44
'/ Realization ratios = actual trade/predicted  trade. Values  less than  100  suggest "undertrade"  and  those more than  100
suggest  "overtrade."  Predicted and actual  data refer to 2000.
Source: Authors'  own  calculations.  Data from  for Albania-IMF  estimate;  for  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina-National
Statistics  and  IMF;  for Croatia-official  National  Statistics;  for FYR Macedonia-official  National  Statistics;  for  FR
Yugoslavia-official  National Statistics; and for other countries-IMF  directions of trade statistics.
This would suggest that there is huge potential for expansion  in trade between  SEE-5 and
other Balkan countries.  However,  it is not clear what impedes this trade.  Since many countries
already  have FTAs, there  is not much to  remove  in terms of tariff barriers.  In  fact, there was no
positive correlation  between  over-  or under-trading  and the  existence  of pre-MOU  FTAs.  Take
Bulgaria  for  instance.  In 2000  it  had  FTA with FYR  Macedonia  but not with FR  Yugoslavia.
Yet the  respective  realization  ratios  were  41  percent  with  the former  and  84  percent  with  the
latter.  Albania did not have FTA with the EU, yet the realization  ratio of trade with Greece was
the highest for Albania's  trading partners  in the Balkans.  This  is  in sharp contrast to other  SEE-5
countries,  except FR Yugoslavia,  which had  had practically  duty free access to Greece  under the
EU ATP  regime  in  place  prior to  the  SA  process.  Preferential  access  failed  to  spur trade.  It
appears that  barriers  other than tariffs  have  prevented trade  in the region  from  reaching  its  full24
potential. By the same token,  it is far from certain that a network of FTAs would provide  a boost
to trade of SEE-5 with other Balkan countries.
For  all  these  reasons,  one  may  conclude  that  while  the  potential  for trade  expansion
varies across  the region,  it overall does not seem to be high in  short-term.  In the case of former
Yugoslav  economic  space,  except for  a glaring  case of under-trade  between  Croatia and  Serbia,
trade anong other former republics  seems to be at the levels determined by economic factors and
geography.  Ratios of actual  trade to potential  trade for  FYR Macedonia  trade with  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina  and Croatia appear to indicate room for significant expansion.  But considering that
FYR  Macedonia  is  landlocked  and  separated  from  these  two  countries  by  several  border
formalities and  poor transportation,  the distance  in a gravity  equation alone  does not capture  real
barriers to trade faced by FYR Macedonia with its more distant neighbors.  The cost of trading  is
significantly  larger  than  the  distance  alone  might  imply.  Even  its  long-standing  FTA  has  not
helped boost its trade with Bulgaria.  As for other regional partners, their ratios of the actual trade
to  potential  trade  indicate  some  potential  for  expansion.  But  it  appears  to  be  limited  either
because  of geography  (Albania)  or because-as  we  show  below-of the  nature  of the  current
trade  consisting mainly  in  exchanges  of products  of different  sectors  rather  than  in  a two-way
trade of similar products.
Potential for Regional Trade  in Historical and Comparative  Perspective
Trade within  state  borders tends  to be more  intensive than  trade across  borders for  a number  of
reasons  stemming from the absence of international borders.  Firms operate within the same legal
framework;  they  do not  encounter  foreign  exchange  risk;  their products  are  subject to the same
standards;  they  do not face  red tape usually  associated with trading across  international  borders;
they  do  not  fear  of contingent  protection;  etc.  In  consequence,  borders  matter  even  in  trade
among highly  developed  countries  locked  in  a  preferential  trade agreement.  For  instance, trade
among  firms  in Canadian  provinces  bordering the United  States  is  almost 20 times  larger  than
trade  with  US  firms,  even  though  both  countries  are  NAFTA  members  and  share  the  same
language and similar institutions (McCallum  1995).
Another,  admittedly  extreme,  indication  of the  importance  of national  borders  is  trade
among  republics  in  the  Soviet  Union  before  its  dissolution  in  1991.  Shares  of  inter-republic
exports  in republics'  total  exports  in  1989  varied  between the lowest of 68 percent  (Russia) and
the highest of 98 percent (Kyrgyz Republic).  Shares of this trade predicted  by the gravity model
for  the  former  Soviet  republics  were  almost  three  times  lower  ranging  between  16  percent
(Russia)  and  37  percent  (Kyrgyz  Republic).32 Their  high  levels  reflected  not  only  the  anti-
external  trade bias of the Soviet Union under central planning but also the fact that trade between
the former republics was internal trade.
While  Yugoslav  inter-republic  trade  shared  both  of these  features,  anti-export  bias  of
Yugoslav  import-substitution  strategy  was  markedly  weaker  and  the  size  of its  economy  was
smaller.  Thus  one  would  expect  much  lower  levels  of dependence  on  intra-republic  trade.
Indeed  it  appears  that  by  the  demanding  "Soviet"  standards  internal  trade  among  Yugoslav
republics was even  lower than one might expect.  As can be seen from data in Table 6, the shares
of inter-republic exports in total exports ranged  between 43 (Serbia)  and 57 percent (Croatia).
32  See Table 2 in Kaminski, Wang and Winters  (1996, p.  13).25
Table 6: Directions  of shipments originating  informer Yugoslav republics in 1987 and 2000 (in percent)
Exports to  External  Exports to  Other  Exports to
other republics  exports  in  former republics  exports  republics,  Index
in 1987  1987  in 2000  in  2000  2000
1987=100
Bosnia and Herzegovina  55  45  34  66  62
Croatia  57  43  26  75  46
Macedonia (FYR Macedonia)  55  45  27  74  49
Montenegro  59  41
Serbia (including Kosovo and  43  57
Vojvodina)
Serbia  46  54  29  71  63
Kosovo  68  32
Vojvodina  69  31
Slovenia  48  52  14  86  29
Average  56  44  26  86  46
Source: for 1987 calculated from data in Uvalic (2000) and for 2000: Bosnia and Herzegovina from
National Statistics  and IMF; and for other countries-National  Statistics.
Hinic  (1994)  and  Uvalic  (1993)  draw  the  conclusion  that,  since  the  former  Yugoslav
republics  traded  with  each  other  more  than  with  the  outside  world,  the  level  of  economic
interdependence  among Yugoslav republics was "...  greater than usually sustained  on the basis of
purely political arguments".33 In other words, economic forces  bound them very closely together
independently of political ones.  But considering that they were  then part of the same state with
the same  currency and laws applying across the whole territory,  intemal trade as measured by the
share of exports to other republics  in total exports amounting to 56 percent was  rather small.  In
fact,  the  average  share  was  well  below  the  average  for EU-members  in the  1990s.  Intra-EU
exports accounted  on average for 60 percent of total exports  originating  in EU member countries
in  1990-95,  although  the  EU was  then  neither  a unitary  state  nor  a  fully  integrated  economic
grouping.
Considering that exports to other former republics are no longer internal trade but foreign
trade,  much  lower current levels  of trade among  former Yugoslav  republics  should come  as no
surprise.  The  emergence  of borders  was  bound  to  increase  dramatically  the  cost  of trading.
Consider  that  despite  FTA  the  United  States-Canada  border  imposes  barriers  to  arbitrage
equivalent  to 2,700 kilometers (Engel and Rogers  1996).  Inserting more than one border together
with less efficient customs services  increase these costs rather dramatically.
In addition,  the violent  dissolution of the former  SFRY  was bound  to contribute  to the
suppression  of trade  going  beyond  the  impact  of a  shift  from  intemal  to extemal  trade.  Yet,
excluding  Slovenia, the share of exports to former Yugoslav  republics fell by between 44 percent
for Croatia  and 37 percent  for Serbia  (including  Vojvodina  in 2000).  In comparison with other
cases  of the dissolution of a  state, this  does not seem  to be an unusual  or steep contraction.  In
fact,  the average  share of this trade  in 2000 amounting  to 46  percent of its  level  in  1987  is not
33 As quoted in Uvalic (2000).26
particularly striking when set against the same share for the former  Soviet Union which stood  in
1993  at 51  percent of its level in 1990.34
The case  of the  former  Czechoslovakia  sheds  comparative  light  on  the  assessment  of
trade  among  former  Yugoslav  republic,  revealing  that the  decline  in  trade  among  the  former
Yugoslav  republics  has  been  smaller  than  could  have  been predicted.  Three  observations  are
noteworthy.  First,  the  contraction  in  mutual  trade  was  dramatic  in both  relative  and  absolute
terms.  Following  the  'velvet  divorce'  of the  Czechoslovak  federation  on January  1.  1993  the
trade  between  the two  new  sovereign  states  immediately  fell  as  compared  with their 'domestic'
sales  in  1992-Czech  exports  to  Slovakia  declined  24  percent,  and  imports  26  percent
(ECE 1994,  p. 96).  This decline continued  each year over 1993-99  (Table  7). The value  of both
exports and imports was lower  in 1999 than in  1993.
Table 7: The Share of  Slovak Republic  in Czech Exports and Imports and the share of Czech Republic
in Slovak exports and imports, 1993-99 (in percent)
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  Memo:
Index 2001,  1994=100
Czech Republic
Share in exports  16  14  14  13  11  8  7  7  44
Share in imports  14  12  10  8  7  6  5  5  36
Slovak Republic
Share in exports  37  35  31  31  21  18  17  17  46
Share in imports  30  27  25  22  19  17  15  15  50
Source:  Central Statistical Office and Ministry of Industry and Trade and Direction of Trade  Statistics
Yearbook,  IMF, Washington  D.C., various issues.,  and the official web site of the government of Slovakia
http://www.statistics.sk/webdata/english/tab/fot/iaeOl.htm.
Second,  the case of Czech-Slovak mutual  trade  seems to suggest that a more developed
country  expand  its  other  commercial  ties  faster  than  the  less  developed  one.  For  a  more
developed  Czech Republic,  the fall  in the significance  of its trade with a  less  developed  Slovak
Republic  was  steeper  and  Slovakia's  dependence  on  trade  with  Czech  Republic  has  remained
much more significant than that of the Czech Republic on trade with Slovak Republic.
Third,  customs  union  arrangement  between  these  two  countries  did  not  prevent  the
relative  and  absolute contraction  in trade.  If anything,  this  clearly  demonstrates  that even  free
trade falls well short of assuring  the level of interaction  occurring  among firms operating within
the same state boundaries  and using the same currency.35
Hence,  neither  historical  ties nor the experience  of other  countries  that had  shared  the
experience  of the  dissolution  of a  "national"  market  would justify  the  expectation  of a lower
contraction  in trade  among  former  republics.  Policy attempts  specifically  designed  to engineer
recovery of this trade are bound to fail,  as there is not much, if anything,  to  be recovered.  Intra-
34  Calculated  from data in Michalopoulos  and Tarr (1994, p. 6).
35  A  quick  disappearance  of a monetary  union,  which  barely  lasted  for  five  weeks  (between  January  1,
1993  and February 8, 1993)  exacerbated  the decline in trade.  So did the devaluation of the Slovak koruna
against the  Czech  koruna as  well  as  establishment  of a complicated  payment  system.  For more,  see UN
ECE 1994.27
SEE-5  trade will not become  in a  foreseeable  future a lever of economic  growth  of countries  of
the region any time soon.
Dominance  of Inter-industry Trade:  Implications for Expansion and
Pressures for Protection
Three  observations  can be derived from data on the composition of trade among  SEE-5 countries
(Table  8).36  First, manufactures  account for a relatively  low share of intra-SEE-5  trade, although
there are differences  among countries reflecting their uneven level in industrialization.  Except for
FYR  Macedonia's  exports  to  a  more  developed  Croatia  and  Croatian  exports  to  Albania  and
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  the  share  of manufacture  exports  is  below  50  percent.  Agricultural
products  make  up  almost  half of  the  bilateral  trade  recorded  between  FYR Macedonia  and
Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina  and FYR Macedonia.
Second,  some dyads  exhibit the traditional division  of labor linking  least developed and
highly  developed  countries  through  exchanges  of raw  materials  and  low  processed  goods  for
processed  ones.  For  instance,  take  the  dyads:  Albania-Croatia  and  Albania-FYR  Macedonia.
Albania  specializes  in exports  of production  inputs  to these economies,  which,  in turn process,
them and export some portion back.  These inputs include  items, which-unlike  components  and
parts-have no discernible use in their present form and are basically unprocessed.  Agricultural
raw materials,  ores,  minerals and nonferrous  materials  regarded  as traditional  production inputs,
i.e.,  not processed  in their present  form,  account for  a  dominant  share  of Albania's  exports  to
Croatia (96 percent) and FYR Macedonia (88 percent).  Manufactures account for 72 percent and
56 percent of Albania's  imports  from these two countries  respectively  (Table  8).  Thus Albania
seems to be locked  in a traditional division of labor as a supplier of production  inputs in return for
manufactures,  albeit  with  a  caveat.  The  share  of production  inputs  in  exports  from  higher
developed  Croatia  and  FYR Macedonia  remains  quite  significant  pointing  to  some  processing
within  Albania.  The  situation  in other  dyads  is even  less  clear  with  a mixture  of production
inputs and final products dominating mutual trade.
Third,  both import  and export  baskets  in trade among  SEE-5  diverge  rather significantly
from those that they have in trade with the EU.  In both exports  to and  imports from the  EU of
each  SEE-5  economy  manufactured  goods  account  for a  dramatically  larger  share than  in their
mutual  trade.  Contrary to  expectations,  Albania's  trade  is  no  exception  to  this  pattern  with
manufactures accounting for more than 80 percent of their exports to the EU.  The composition  of
SEE-5  exports  to  the  EU  is  quite  similar  with  textiles  and  clothing,  footwear  and  wood
accounting  for between  30  percent (FR Yugoslavia)  and 54 percent (Albania).  These  shares for
other  countries  were  40  percent  in  Croatia's  exports,  51  percent  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina
exports and 45 percent in FYR Macedonia exports.
In  contrast,  textiles  and  footwear  represent  only a small  fraction  of intra-regional  trade
compared with its weight in the total exports for most of SEE-5  countries.  For instance, while for
Albania,  Croatia,  Bosnia and  Herzegovina,  and  FYR Macedonia  exports  of textiles  to the  EU
represent  around  one third of their total exports  to that  region,  they account  for a much smaller
share of their exports  to the region.  The only exception  is Bosnia and Herzegovina with exports
of textiles to FR Yugoslavia accounting  in 1999 for 30 percent of its total FR Yugoslavia-oriented
exports.  FR Yugoslavia appears  to  be  an  important  outlet  for  final  consumer  goods  including
footwear from Croatia and FYR Macedonia.  Wood products  are an important item  in Bosnia and
36  Federal  Republic  of Yugoslavia  is not included  because  of the  unavailability  of disaggregated  foreign
trade  data.28
Herzegovina  exports to Croatia and FYR Macedonia and  iron and  steel account for a significant
portion of FYR Macedonia's  exports.
Table 8: Composition  of trade among SEE-5 countries (excluding FRY)  in 1999 (SITC. Rev.  2)
1999 Imports  from:  1999 Exports to:
ALBANIA  Croatia  Bosnia  FYR  EU  Croatia  Bosnia and  FYR  EU
and  Macedonia  Herzegovina  Macedonia
Herzegovina
Food products (0 + I + 22 + 4)  10%  100%  42%  21%  0%  0%  33%  5%
Agricultural  Materials  (2-22-27-28)  6%  0%  1%  1%  12%  0%  10%  7%
Textiles fibres (26)  6%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  2%  0%
Ores, minerals & metals (27 + 28 +  0%  0%  0%  1%  84%  0%  7%  2%
68)
Energy (3)  6%  0%  0%  5%  0%  0%  32%  2%
Manufacturing  (5 to 8 - 68),  72%  0%  56%  72%  4%  0%  16%  84%
BOSNIA  and  1999 Imports from:  1999 Exports to:
HERZEGOVINA  Albania  Croatia  FYR  EU  Albania  Croatia  FYR  EU
Macedonia'  Macedonia
Food products (0 + I + 22 + 4)  No imp.  30%  32%  18%  100%  15%  41%  2%
Agricultural  Materials (2-22-27-28)  No imp  0%  4%  1%  0%  15%  13%  19%
Textiles fibres (26)  No imp  0%  3%  1%  0%  0%  0%  0%
Ores, minerals & metals (27 + 28 +  No imp  1%  3%  1%  0%  30%  6%  17%
68)
Energy (3)  No imp  15%  0%  1%  0%  10%  0%  0%
Manufacturing  (5 to 8- 68)  No imp  53%  58%  78%  0%  31%  39%  62%
1999 Imports from:  1999 Exports to:
CROATIA  Albania  Bosnia and  FYR  EU  Albania  Bosnia and  FYR  EU
Herzegovina  Macedonia  Herzegovina  Macedonia
Food products (0+1 + 22 + 4)  0%  15%  18%  7%  17%  30%  28%  3%
Agricultural  Materials (2-22-27-28)  12%  15%  1%  2%  6%  1%  1%  8%
Textiles fibres (26)  0%  0%  0%  0%  6%  0%  0%  0%
Ores, minerals & metals (27 + 28 +  84%  30%  5%  2%  0%  1%  2%  5%
68)
Energy (3)  0%  10%  0%  2%  6%  15%  23%  4%
Manufacturing  (5 to 8 - 68)  4%  31%  75%  86%  72%  53%  47%  80%
1999 Imports from:  1999 Exports to:
FYR MACEDONIA  Albania  Bosnia and  Croatia  EU  Albania  Bosnia and  Croatia  EU
Herzegovina  Herzegovina
Food products (0+ 1 + 22 + 4)  33%  41%  28%  12%  42%  36%  18%  9%
Agricultural  Materials (2-22-27-28)  11%  13%  1%  2%  1%  4%  1%  2%
Textiles and fibres (26)  3%  0%  0%  1%  0%  3%  0%  0%
Ores, minerals & metals (27 + 28 +  7%  6%  2%  1%  0%  3%  5%  9%
68)
Energy (3)  33%  0%  23%  19%  0%  0%  0%  0%
Manufacturing (5  to 8 -68),  12%  39%  46%  66%  56%  52%  75%  80%
Source: UN COMTRADE database.
In  all,  intra-SEE-5  trade  remains  mainly of inter-industry  type  with  limited  exchanges
occurring  within the same  sectors.  Table 9 tabulates the  share of intra-industry  trade,  i.e.,  two-
way  trade  in  similar  products  in  trade  with  other  SEE-5  countries,  as  measured  by the  G-L
(Grubbel-Lloyd)  index  (values  of  G-L  indices  are  above  the  diagonal).37 Because  of  large
37  The  Grubbel-Lloyd  index  is  the  difference  between  unity and the  quotient of the  absolute  difference
between  exports  and  imports  of  a  given  sector  and  the  total  of imports  and  exports  for  this  sector.
Calculations here  are based  on 2-digit SITC,  Rev.3.  data.  The  index assumes  the  value of  100  percent  in29
discrepancies  in data reported by SEE-5  countries on their mutual trade, we  averaged the data on
imports and exports  as reported by respective  partners.
The  values  of  G-L  indices  for  intra-SEE-5  trade  are  extremely  low,  and  probably
overestimated  given  a high  level  of aggregation  of trade  data,  not only  for Albania's  trade but
also  for  trade  among  former Yugoslav  republics.  There  are  also  huge  imbalances  in  this  trade
(values  below the  diagonal  in Table 9).  For instance,  Croatia's exports to Albania  are 24-times
larger  than  its  imports  from  Albania.  Croatia's  and FYR  Macedonia's  exports  to Bosnia  and
Herzegovina  and  Albania  are  almost  five-times  larger than  their respective  imports  from  these
countries.
Table 9: Values of Grubbel-Lloyd  indices (above diagonal) and ratio of exports (reporters  in rows) to
imports  from other SEE-5 countries in 1999 (in percent)
Albania  Bosnia and  Croatia  FYR Macedonia
Herzegovina
Albania  N/A  0  1  15
Bosnia and Herzegovina  0  N/A  23  15
Croatia  2378  474  N/A  19
FYR Macedonia  474  209  80  N/A
Source: Own calculations  based on data from WITS database.
The low levels of intra-industry trade in trade among  SEE-5 countries have two important
implications.  First, they point to a limited potential  for growth at least in  the short term,  i.e.,  until
new industrial capacities  are established.  At present the differences  in factor endowments  rather
than economies of scale associated  with supplying a larger  market and  fixed costs of production
continue  driving this trade.  Low values  of G-L  indices  usually  indicate  limited trade in  similar
differentiated  products, which, in turn, point to low levels of interaction  among firms operating in
the  same  networks  of production  and  distribution  as suppliers  of parts and  components.  Since
previous ties among industrial  firms within the former SFRY were weak  and a decade of turmoil
in the region wiped them away,  these would have to be built from scratch.  While  one may hope
that the  SA process  will lead to  the creation of a regional  market,  the crux  of the  matter  is that
investment  response  to  these  new  opportunities  offered  by  a  larger  market  will  not  happen
overnight.
Second, the low levels  of intra-industry  trade,  as captured  by the values of G-L  indices,
suggest not only the  low potential  for  growth,  but also considerable  potential  for protectionism
and trade friction.3 8 The  dominance of inter-industry  trade has  serious implications  for regional
trade  liberalization  effort.  Inter-industry  trade,  which  is  driven  by  gains  from  differing  factor
proportions,  may  produce  significant  inequalities  in  regional  development  and  income
distribution.  Conforming  upon  this  trade  preferential  treatment  would  have  serious  income-
distributional  ramifications  threatening  incomes  of  unskilled  labor  force  in  more  developed
countries  and  those  of skilled  labor  force  in  less  developed  areas.  To  be  sure,  liberalization
the presence  of two-way trade across all sectors and zero when  exports do not overlap with imports across
sectors.
38  There  are some  exceptions,  however.  As discussed  below,  profiles  of economic  structures  and trade
indicate  some complementarity,  which  would  suggest  lower adjustment  cost of trade  liberalization.  The
examples are the following dyads: Albania-Croatia and Albania-FYR Macedonia.30
among  partners  mainly  engaged  in  intra-industry  trade  also  imposes  adjustment  costs.  The
difference  is, however,  that adjustment triggered  by liberalization  does not affect whole sectors,
as is the case with inter-industry trade, but rather  individual firms.39
In  consequence,  the  danger  is  that  instead  of  creating  foundations  for  regional
cooperation and security, preferential  trade arrangements  among these countries linked mainly in
inter-industry  exchanges  might  create  new  areas  for  tension  mainly  between  more  and  less
developed partners,  but not only.  Thus, the policy dilemma can be  phrased  as follows: while the
development of a larger regional free trade area may offer incentives to investments  leading to the
development  of intra-industry  trade driven by comparative  advantage operating within products,40
it may also exacerbate  existing  inequalities  in  regional development  and income  distribution.  In
order  to  avoid  the  latter  outcome,  SEE-5  trade  liberalization  should  accompany  their  trade
liberalization  with  the  EU.  The  two  pursued together  will  lead  to  the  emergence  of markets
offering  new  opportunities.  But  without  structural  reforms  aimed  at  establishing  business/
investment  friendly environment,  they may not be tapped.
Conclusion
The  economic  rationale  behind  moves  encouraging  SEE-5  countries  to  engage  in  free  trade
negotiations  with one another  is the belief,  albeit not always explicitly stated, that the network of
regional  FTAs will contribute  to sustained  economic  growth.  Kovac41 (1998)  argues  that trade
liberalization  could  increase  regional  trade  flows,  and  if  foreign  trade  were  to  increase
sufficiently,  it  could  create  exceptionally  strong  impulses  for economic  development,  with  both
static  and dynamic gains accruing to each  SEE.  This  argument  assumes that trade  among SEE-5
countries is suppressed  due to non-economic  reasons.
But the  empirical  analysis of this section  does not give support to this  conclusion.  The
results of our gravity exercise indicate that intra-regional trade  is well below its equilibrium  level,
mainly  due  to  low  intra-regional  trade  of Balkan  countries  that  were  not  part  of the  former
Yugoslav  space.  As for trade among former Yugoslav republics,  excluding trade between Croatia
and FR Yugoslavia, there  is no much room  for the increase.  While the  share of trade among the
former  Yugoslav republics declined,  it still remains  at a  relatively  high  level for most countries.
The  contraction  in  the share of mutual  trade of former Czechoslovakia  was much  larger  despite
preferential  treatment  under customs  union  and  the  respective  shares  are  lower.  On  the  other
hand, Albania,  Bulgaria  and Romania not only  under-trade  with  each  other but they also  under-
trade  with  former  Yugoslav  SEE  countries.  Here  the  potential  for  expansion  is  much  larger,
albeit  with  a caveat.  The  caveat  is  that this  potential  will  not  be realized  without  better road
39  The theory  holds that intra-industry is a win-win  situation for  all, as consumers  in countries involved in
this  trade  enjoy  an  expanded  range of products,  and  nobody  suffers a  loss  of income,  either  relative  or
absolute.
40  The  force  driving  two-way  trade  in similar  differentiated  products  is economies  associated  with
supplying  a larger market,  whereas  the reason  a country  cannot produce  a complete  range of products  is
fixed  costs  of production.  This  trade  does not  involve  relocation  of whole  industries.  In consequence,
specialization  in  differentiated  products  associated  with  intra-industry  trade  poses  fewer  adjustment
problems than inter-industry  trade (Krugman  1994: 38-51).
41  Quoted  in Uvalic  (2000).  The  East West  Institute report (EWI  2000)  does not  seem to share  Kovac's
view  pointing  to  behind-the-border  measures  as  having  far  more  depressing  effect  on  trade  than  tariffs.
Uvalic (2000)  in turn shows  that this trade would  have to  be built from  scratch.  Hence,  it seems that the
removal of border or behind-the-border  measures would have  only a marginal impact on  intra-SEE-5 trade.
Further,  the increase may result from trade diversion (See Section 5).31
network  (especially  so in  the case  of Albania),  investment  regimes and trade  liberalization-as
argued earlier-along  two other dimensions:  vis-A-vis the EU and MiFN partners.
Hence,  two practical  policy  recommendations  follow  from this  analysis.  First,  the time
during which firms from SEE-5  and other Stability Pact countries  would enjoy preferential tariff
margins over  suppliers from the EU  should be  shortened.  This would  suggest a faster reduction
of tariff rates  on  imports  from  the  EU.  Second,  high  MFN  tariff  rates  on  industrial  products
should be significantly lowered  with the entry in force of FTAs.  This would reduce  the level of
protection  accorded  to  SEE-5  firms  that  may  be  competitive  in  other  regional  markets  thanks
solely to high tariffs.
5.  POTENTIAL  FOR TRADE  DIVERSION  AND TRADE CREATION:  WELFARE
EFFECTS  OF DISCRIMINATORY  TARIFF  REDUCTIONS
Jacob  Viner (1950)  introduced  a  seminal  distinction  between  two  static  effects  of FTA-trade
creation  and  trade  diversion.  Both  stem  from  the  fact  that  FTA,  by  definition  implying
discriminatory  liberalization, artificially changes relative competitiveness  of goods from countries
entering  the  FTA.  The  cost  of trade  diversion  is  due  to  the fact  that  after the discriminatory
liberalization,  the country  purchases  from  a  higher-cost international  supplier.  Trade  diversion
represents  static  costs,  as  it  suppresses  imports  from  more  efficient  industries  in  excluded
countries.  Trade diversion entailing the switch  in supply source  from internationally competitive
to more expensive FTA suppliers occurs  only if partner country's costs are out of line with costs
and prices  in the rest of the world.  The EU's Common Agricultural  Policy provides  an extreme
illustration of a trade diversion  effect.  It increases  the "regional"  trade  at the expense  of trade
with outside countries.
In  contrast,  trade  creation  has  positive  effects  similar  to  those  obtained  under  non-
discriminatory tariff cuts.42 It generates trade at the expense of inefficient suppliers in the member
countries.  Since  trade  creation  results  in  a partner  country's  production  displacing  higher  cost
domestic production,  it does not increase "regional"  trade at the expense of outside countries  and
yields  static  benefits  to FTA participants.  The FTA has  the potential  for increasing  welfare  of
both partners only insofar as trade creation exceeds trade diversion.  In other words, a country can
lose when  it  liberalizes  on  a  discriminatory  basis,  if the  cost  of trade  diversion  outweighs  the
benefits from trade creation.
Large  theoretical  literature  on bilateral  trade integration  offers  many rules of thumb  as to
when  FTA  is  likely  to result  in  welfare  loss.  The  most  important  and  enduring ones  concern
MFN  tariffs  and  the fraction  of imports  that  come from  other  participants  in  FTA.  High  and
dispersed  external tariffs  and low mutual trade are conducive  to trade diversion.  High preference
margins provide  a strong incentive to home consumers to switch from a low-cost supplier outside
the FTA to a high-cost one from a FTA partner country.  The level of pre-FTA trade with an FTA
partner affects the size of trade diversion effect.  If initial pre-FTA imports are low, the likelihood
of replacing  a low-cost MFN supplier with  a higher-cost FTA supplier increases.
This  section  seeks  to  answer  the  question  about  the  potential  for trade  diversion  as  a
result of discriminatory  liberalization.  The  logic underlying this analysis  is as follows.  Level of
imports  and  MFN  tariffs  provide  glimpses  into  this  issue.  Intra-SEE-5  trade,  examined  in
42  These  positive effects include  lower domestic  prices thanks to  increased  competition  from  imports  and
closing down of some high-cost firms replaced by lower-cost imports.32
previous section,  is in line with their respective  economic "weight"  with the possible exceptions
of FRY with Croatia, and of Albania with other SEE economies.  However, the shares of SEE-5
imports in their respective total imports are low, which may suggest the potential  for diversion.43
We focus  below  on MFN tariffs.  We begin with  the examination of distortions  related to their
tariff structures  followed  by the analysis of tariffs  in their  mutual trade.  Linking major  exports
from  SEE-5  with  MFN  tariffs  in SEE  markets  sheds  light  on  the  scope  of their  distortionary
impact independently  of whether  exporters  face tariffs or have  a duty-free  access.  We conclude
with a formal welfare  analysis of FTA between  some SEE, which have not signed FTAs,  i.e., the
following  dyads:  Albania-Croatia,  Albania-Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  Albania-FYR
Macedonia. 4"
MFN  Tariff Structures In  SEE-5  Countries
Tariff  structure  can  be  the  source  of two  types  of distortions  in  domestic  production  and
distribution  pattems:  those  related  to dispersion  in tariff rates and  those  caused  by differences
between  MFN applied  rates and preferential or zero  rates on imports from FTA countries.  First,
dispersion  in  tariff  rates  frequently  lead  to  prices  that  seriously  distort  production  and
consumption  patterns.  Low and  uniform  tariff rate minimizes the  net welfare  cost.45 The four-
band  MFN  tariff structures  of Albania  and  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  with  a maximum  rate  of
15 percent  are the closest among  SEE-5 to the  "ideal"  of the uniform tariff schedule  (Table  10).
The  higher  the  dispersion  in  tariff  rates,  as  measured  by  the  standard  deviation  (absolute
dispersion  between  items),  the  larger  are  potential  distortions-as  the  variance  in  tariff rates
causes the variation in imported  product prices.  By this measure, the tariff structures  of Albania
and Bosnia and Herzegovina  seem to be the least distorting among SEE-5 countries.  The overall
standard deviation  of their NIFN rates-5.7 and 4.7 percent respectively-are  larger than that in
the  EU  but  lower  than  in external  tariffs  of many  other transition  economies.  For  instance,
Bulgaria's MFN tariffs have the standard deviation of 9.3 percent.
The  second type of distortions  is generated  by FTAs.  These preferences  and exemptions
from  uniform  MFN  treatment of external  suppliers  implicit in FTAs can be highly  distortionary.
The granting  of a preferential  treatment to suppliers  may be purely trade  diverting if this merely
compensates  for  their  cost disadvantage.  Consider  the  following:  importers  will  often  choose
product originating  in a  preferential  country  although  the  same product  may  be  available  at a
lower cost from  a firm facing an MFN rate.  Furthermore,  an  exporter from a preferential  area-
even though otherwise  competitive in world markets-may  price its  products to  capture the rent
up to  a margin  below  the MFN  applied  rate.  Whatever  the  case,  the loser  is ultimately  a local
user of imports.
4  This  observation  does not contradict  the conclusion  about the  low potential  for growth in intra-SEE-5
trade.  The  point  is rather that  domestic  products that  are  not  competitive  in international  markets  will
expand their sales to partner countries solely  thanks to protection.  Moreover,  because  inter-industry  trade
prevails in  intra-SEE-5  trade, whole sectors of the economy  may bear costs of adjustment  to bilateral  trade
liberalization.
44  Not all  future FTAs  among SEE-5  are examined,  no trade data disaggregated  at six-digit  HS  level  are
available  for FR Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  For similar reasons,  we disregard  two customs
areas-Kosovo and Montenegro.
45  The welfare  loss (total  deadweight)  increases  as  tariff structure  becomes  more diversified.  A uniform
nominal  tax minimizes  the  net welfare  cost insofar  as two conditions  are  met:  import  demand  elasticities
are uniform across commodities;  and cross-price  effects are negligible.  See Panagariya  and Rodrik (1993).33
Table 10: Characteristics  of  MFN tariff  schedules in SEE-5 countries (2000)
Memorandum
MFN Tariff  Albania  Bosnia and  Croatia  FYR  FR  FR
Schedules  Herzegovin  Macedonia  Yugoslavia'"  Yugoslavia
a  2001'
Simple average tariff  8.1  6.2  10.6  15.0  14.4  (9.2)
Percent of tariff lines  0  0
above 15%
Agricultural  products  10.9  4.9  15.3  21.8  23.0  n.a.
(HS  1-24)
Industrial products  7.3  6.2  9.6  13.2  13.0  n.a.
(HS 25-97)
Weighted average  11.6  n.a.  9.0  14.2  9.12**  n.a.
tariff*
Range/Maximum  0, 2,  10,  0, 5, 10,  15  0-25%  0-60%  0-40%  0-30%
tariff rates  15
Standard deviation  5.7  4.7  7.4  12.4  10.8  n.a
Coefficient of  0.7  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.8  n.a.
variation
Specific rates  No  No  592  No  420 agricultural  n.a.







Source: Own calculationsfrom national  tariff  schedules
*  /Albania: IMF; Croatia:  IMF; FYR Macedonia: Daskalov et al. 2001
**/Calculatedfrom 2000 tariff  schedule and total imports without considering importsfrom FTA countries.
/ In  May 2001,  the government  introduced a new tariff schedule reducing  levels of protection.
These  losses  are  somewhat  mitigated,  as  SEE-5  economies  have  relatively  low  MIFN
tariff rates relative to other countries at a  similar level of economic development.  FR Yugoslavia
and  FYR  Macedonia  have  the  highest  simple  average  rates  of  14  percent  and  15  percent
respectively.  But  even  these  do  not  diverge  significantly  from  the  simple  average  rate  of
14 percent of all IMF  members.  Despite different  structures of production,  the former Yugoslav
republics  display significant  similarities  in their respective tariff schedules.  The  last decade  has
not significantly  impacted  the structure of protection  inherited  from  formerSFRY,  although their
level  declined  in  all  former  republics.  They  all  seem  to  be  protecting  the  same  sectors  and
products.  It  is  interesting  to note  that Albania's  structure  of tariff protection  does not  diverge
largely from those in former Yugoslav republics,  while that of the EU is dramatically different.
However,  the  differences  become  more  visible  once  the  cascading  effects  of tariff
structures  are taken  into account.  Note that since tariffs are not uniform, protection  (or subsidy)
offered  to  domestic  producers  is  not  neutral  among  products  at  various  stages  of processing.
SEE-5  tariff structure  tend  to  "discriminate"  against  low  processed  products  leading  to tariff
escalation,  i.e.,  tariffs  for  fully  processed  products  tend  to  be  higher than  for  semi-processed
products  and  raw materials.  But  overall  the  cascading  effect  is  relatively  low,  as  the  simple
average tariff rates  on products  in the third stage of processing are not significantly  larger than on34
the  first-  or second-stage  of processing (Table  1  1).46  The  highest relative  differential  between
the final and the first stage of processing was for Albania and the lowest for Croatia.47
Table 11: Tariff  escalation in SEE-5 countries by industrial  sector (2000)
Albania  Bosnia and  Croatia  FYR
Herzegovina  Macedonia
Good's category-stage  of production'  1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3
0.Food&liveanimals  10  10  11  3  5  8  14  14  18  22  18  28
1.  Beverages & tobacco  3  - 15  15  - 14  20  - 22  16  - 55
2. Crude materials exl.  food and fuel  4  5  - 1  2  - 6  5  - 6  6  -
3. Mineral,  lubricants, fuels and related  8  12  8  1  0  1  5  8  9  4  3  7
materials
4. Animal and vegetable oil, fat and  - - 8  - - 3  - - 12  - - 7
waxes
5. Chemical  and related products, n.e.s  10  4  7  0  3  4  10  7  10  5  6  12
6. Manufactured goods  2  8  13  8  6  9  11  7  14  15  10  19
7. Machinery and transport equipment  - - 4  - - 6  - - 9  - - 12
8. Miscellaneous manufactured  articles  2  11  11  10  10  10  20  15  16  15  24  23
TOTAL  6  8  10  5  4  7  12  9  14  12  11  20
1/ According to WTO classification:  1:  raw materials; 2:  intermediate products;  3: final products.
Source:  Own calculations  based on national MEN tariff schedules.
At the level of single-digit SITC  sectors the differences  become more pronounced,  albeit
not dramatic.  Eyeballing the data in Table  11  leads to two observations.  First, each country  has
at least one  sector with higher tariff protection of either  intermediate  or low processed products.
For instance,  Croatia offers higher protection to low processed products than to final products of
the  miscellaneous  manufacture  sector  (SITC.  6).  So  does  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  but  to
beverages  and  tobacco,  and Albania  to  producers  of chemicals  and related  products  (SITC.  5).
Second, while the levels of tariff protection  across sectors  differ widely,  sector  patterns are quite
similar.
One may thus conclude  that the structures of tariffs in SEE-5  will not magnify the effects
that  discriminatory  liberalization  of  tariffs  might  have  because  of  high  rates  of  effective
protection.  While we have no data on the rates of effective protection, the closer the structure of
tariffs  is  to uniformity  the  lower  is their  deviation  from  actual  tariff rates.  When  the  rate  is
uniform,  its value equals  the rate of effective protection.  As we  have seen,  SEE-5  structures  of
tariffs  are  mostly relatively  uniform  without any  discernible  deliberate  tariff escalation.48 This
suggests that rates of effective protection  are not significantly larger than  applied tariff rates  and
will not significantly contribute to trade diversion.
46  The  classification  of different  stages of production  was calculated  according  to the WTO classification
used in Trade Policy Reviews.
47  Tariff escalation has not been  computed for FRY owing to unavailability  of tariff schedule in  electronic
form.
48  Tariff  escalation,  closely  related  to  the  concept  of effective  protection,  occurs  if duty  rates  on  raw
materials  and  intermediate  inputs  are set lower than rates  on processed commodities.  It reveals the  extent
to  which  a  government  accords  preference  to  activities  at down-stream  stages  of production.  With  a
uniform rate, there is  no tariff escalation.35
Tariffs on Imports from  SEE Countries
Trade  among  some  SEE  countries  was  subject  to  several  FTAs-albeit  with  unclear  product
coverage-even  prior to the signing of the MOU.  How  significant  are then tariff rates faced by
SEE exporters  in SEE markets?  While the general  MIFN  conditions can  be easily  derived  from
the  analysis  of tariff structures  (Section  5.1),  they  do  not tell  much  about the  scope  for trade
diversion  implicit  in the composition  of their mutual trade.  Some more detailed  insights can  be
derived from examining the average MFN tariff rates that the 25 major exports (6-digit HS items)
from each  SEE-5 country would  face in other SEE-5  countries.  The rationale behind this exercise
is that these are their most competitive products in which each SEE-5  has comparative  advantage.
The  results  that  we  obtain  below  suggest that,  while  the  potential  for  FTAs  to  lead  to  trade
diversion  was  high  in  the  recent  past,  tariff  cuts  already  implemented  in  Albania  and  FR
Yugoslavia  have  significantly  reduced  it, and  further  expected  MFN  tariff reductions  by  the
WTO-acceding  countries will reduce it further.
Available  data  do  not allow  to  carry  out this  calculation  beyond  2000,  nor  to  include
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  in  a  calculation  based  on  2000  data.  This  limitation  is  important,
because since  2000 both  Albania  and  FR Yugoslavia  have reduced  their import  tariffs.  Noting
this  limitation,  and  the  fact  that  it  results  in  overstating  the  potential  for  trade  diversion,  we
present  in Table  12  the  average  MNF  tariff rate  that  would be  faced  by  the top  25  exports  by
SEE-5 countries  in  their respective markets.
Table  12: Average  MFN tariff  rate (that would be) faced by top 25 exports in respective  SEE-5 markets
(in percent) '
25 main exports of  2:  Albania  Croatia  FYR  FR
Macedonia  Yugoslavia
Albania(average  MFN rate, 8%)  ----  5  10  8
Croatia  19  ----  16  9
(average MFN rate,  11 %)
Bosnia and Herzegovina  (average MFN rate, 6%)  11  6  11  7
FYR Macedonia  (average MFN rate,  15%)  25  16  ----  13'
FR Yugoslavia  (average MFN rate,  14%)  24  11  21  ----
Percent of total exports of 25 main exports:  70  39  49  37
Source:  calculated  with  data  from  the  2000  Tariff  Schedules,  UNCOMTRADE  and Federal  Statistical
Office Yugoslavia.  See also Table  11  for data on average tariff rates.
'/ According 2000 MEN tariff schedules.
2/ Export  data for Albania,  Croatia,  and FYR  Macedonia  from  1998;  export  data for FR Yugoslavia  from
2000;  export  data  for  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  not  available:  25  Main  exports  at  6-digit-level  of the
HS Code.
/ FTA in  effect.
As can be  seen  from data in Table  12 above,  in 2000 the tariff rates  facing SEE-5  most
competitive  products  in  SEE-5  markets  were  quite high,  albeit there  is  some  variation.  In the
cases  where  there  is  a  bilateral  FTA  (marked with asterisk),  MFEN  tariff rates  simply  show the
margin of preference  rate at which the main exports were entering each  other's market.  Albania's
main  exports  faced  the highest  MFN  rates  in markets  of four  SEE-5  countries  examined  here.
The  average  rates  on  its top  25  products,  accounting  for 70  percent  of its total  exports,  ranged
from  11  percent  in Bosnia and Herzegovina  to  25  percent  in FYR Macedonia.  Hence,  zeroing
these  tariff rates  would  have  led  to  preferential  margins  in  double  digit  levels,  suggesting  a
significant potential  for trade diversion.  Note also that that these tariffs  were significantly larger36
than  simple  average  MFN  rates  in  respective  markets.  This  appears  to  suggest  that Albanian
main exports would qualify as sensitive in these markets.
Croatia's  top  exports  faced  double  digit  tariff  rates  in  FR Yugoslavia,  albeit  below
FR Yugoslavia's  simple  MFN  average  rate,  and  low  tariff rates  of 5 percent  in Albania.  The
latter suggest low potential  for trade diversion once a FTA is in place.  The highest MFN rates on
exports  originating  were  in  FYR  Macedonia,  but  these  were  not  applied  because  of the  FTA.
FYR Macedonia  exports  would have  faced  similarly high tariff rates  in  Croatia.  These  suggest
that  the  FTA  between  these  two countries  has  probably  resulted  in  significant  trade  diversion.
The  same  observation  applies  to  FTA  between  FR  Yugoslavia  and  FYR  Macedonia.
FR Yugoslavia's  main  exports  faced  the  lowest  rates,  the  highest  being  with  FYR  Macedonia
with whom they have signed a FTA.
In general,  these calculations  indicate that trade diversion has been a significant factor of
FTAs  effective  in the  recent past.  These calculations  also indicate  that,  in  the  future,  bilateral
FTAs could  lead to  similar problems  unless  MFN  rates  on major  exports  from  SEE-5 countries
are  reduced.  The potential  for trade  diversion  in the future  will  however be  by far lower  than
indicated  by  tabulations  in  Table  12.  MFN  tariff rates  for Albania  and  FR  Yugoslavia  have
significantly declined since 2000; and  further MFN tariff reductions  are expected to take place  in
the context of the WTO accession process for FYR Macedonia..
These are merely suppositions  based  on major exports  from SEE-5  and MFN tariff rates
applied  in  their  respective  markets.  Moreover,  they  only  indicate  the  possibility  of  trade
diversion  without  examining  the potential  for trade  creation  as  well as  welfare  effects  of FTA.
The  incoming  expansion  of bilateral  FTAs among  SEE-5  countries  raises  the  question  of their
likely  impact on regional trade and welfare to which we will now turn.  Will FTAs result mainly
in  trade  diversion  or trade  creation  would  exceed trade  diversion?  How will  they  affect  prices
and government revenues?  What would be their impact on welfare?
Estimates  of Welfare  and Revenue  Consequences  of Trade  Liberalization
with EU and  Region
The  welfare  loss from FTA depends  on the  level of MFN tariffs and the fraction  of imports that
come  from other participants  in FTA.  Low and uniform external tariffs do not lead to substantive
preference  margins.  The  incentive  for  trade  diversion  is  low,  and  so  is  the  loss  in  customs
revenue.  On  the  other hand,  high  and  dispersed  tariffs provide  a powerful  incentive  to  home
consumers  to  switch  from a  low-cost supplier  outside  the FTA  to  a high-cost  one from  a FTA
partner  country.  The  size of this  switch  (trade  diversion)  will  be  particularly  large  if pre-FTA
imports were  low.  Then the likelihood  of replacement a  low-cost MFN  supplier with  a higher-
cost FTA supplier increases  leading to substantial  welfare losses.
The  loss  is  twofold:  the  government  loses  customs  revenue  whereas  consumers  loose
because they will be paying higher price for these imports than in international  markets.  In other
words, the government  loses its revenues  to  regional  producers  and its consumers  gain  nothing.
As  can  be seen from  Table  13,  the stakes  are high  as  import  duties accounted  over  1996-98  for
between  8 (Croatia)  and  33  percent  (Albania)  of total  government  revenue.  Revenues  from
import  duties  in  terms  of  GDP  were  particularly  high  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (almost
6 percent), FYR Macedonia and Croatia (3.7 and 3.5 percent,  respectively).  The last two columns
report two estimates of revenue  losses  caused by the elimination  of duties  on imports  from SEE37
countries49-one  based  on  international  taxes  collected  in 2000  (IMF-World  Bank  2001),  and
another  based  on  import duties  as reported  in Table  13.  Except  for  Albania,  the  estimates  are
almost identical.  The cost of a web of FTAs among the SEE-5  countries is the largest for Bosnia
and Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia.
Table 13: Significance of import duties in tax revenues (average over 1996-98)
Total tax  Sales  Excises  Import  Memorandum:  Memorandum: Direct
revenue  turnover or  duties  Import duties  in  revenue loss from SEE
VAT  total tax revenue  FTAs (in percent of GDP)
(in percent of GDP 11j  (in  percent)  IMF-  Own'/
WB  2/
Albania  15.0  4.7  1.2  2.7  18.0  0.5  0.2
Bosnia and  42.9  11.3  5.2  5.9  13.8  1.3  1.4
Herzegovina
Croatia  41.6  13.6  4.5  3.5  8.4  0.1  0.1
FYR Macedonia  36.1  5.4  7.2  3.7  10.2  0.6  0.5
-FRY (1999)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  32.8  0.4  n/a
Kosovo (2000)  6.7  3.5  1.3  1.7  25.4  n/a  n/a
Memorandum:
CEFTA  32.8  7.9  2.6  1.8  5.4
Average  share of GDP during 1996-98, excluding Romania (1996-97)  in calculations of the average  for
CEFTA, Bosnia and Herzegovina  (1998-99), and Kosovo (2000).
2'  Estimate  based of the share of international taxes paid on imports from SEE countries (IMF-World Bank
2001,  Table 9).
31  Estimate based on the average  share of import duties as reported in this Table multiplied by the share of
SEE countries (with which a country had no FTA in 2000) in  total imports.
Sources:  IMF, Government  Finance  Statistics Yearbook  (Washington, various years);  and IMF staff
estimates.
However,  the weakness  of these estimates  is the  underlying  assumption  that geographic
patterns of trade remain unchanged.  This may be the case, albeit unlikely as MFN tariff rates on
many products  offer a significant margin  for preferential  suppliers.  One  may thus expect  trade
creation as well as trade  diversion effects with different  impact on customs revenues  (than in the
case discussed above) as well as on consumer surplus.
In  order to assess the  full impact of regional  FTAs  in terms of trade flows  and welfare
changes, we use a slightly modified version of a model developed  in Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga
(2001).50  This  is a simple  partial  equilibrium  model  of total  import  demand  and  export supply
disaggregated  at a 6-digit HS (harmonized  system)  level.  Since each six-digit HS  item represents
only  a small  share  of the economy,  the effects  of change in tariff rates  on other markets  can be
disregarded.  Import  demand  and export supply  is assumed  to be isoelastic.  They are calibrated
for each country using trade value, unit prices, tariffs and preference  margins at the six-digit tariff
line level in 2000.  Due to the lack of data, Bosnia and Herzegovina  and FR Yugoslavia  are not
included  in  the simulation exercise.  In  the case  of Croatia  and  FYR Macedonia  their bilateral
49  In  addition to SEE-5,  the group includes all other Balkan countries  except for Greece EU member), that
is, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Romania.
50  The model, presented  in Appendix  1, was used to examine the impact of the  elimination of tariff peaks
in  highly  developed  Quad  (EU,  Canada,  Japan,  and  the  US)  countries  on  their imports  from developing
countries.38
trade  is already  duty-free  under pre-MOU  FTA.  Therefore  the effects  of various  scenarios  of
bilateral  liberalization  are only estimated  for the dyads:  Albania-FYR Macedonia  and Albania-
Croatia.
The  model  has  been  run  for  four  different  scenarios,  which  reproduce  policy
recommendations  already  suggested  in  various  publications  (e.g.,  Daskalov  et  al.  2000,  EWI
2000).  The policy variants examined  are as follows (Table  14):
*  Scenariol: It assumes a full-fledged FTA between  Albania and FYR Macedonia  and
Albania and Croatia with their respective MFN rates at applied levels in 2000.
*  Scenario 2:  It adds  to  Scenario  I the  assumption  that  Albania,  Croatia  and  FYR
Macedonia  adopt  the EU  MFN tariff schedule  on  industrial  products  as  their MFN
tariff  schedules  with  one  caveat.  Wherever  the  EU  tariff rate  is  higher  than  the
current  NIFN  tariff applied  by one of these countries, the lower tariff rate is  used.  It
also assumes that FTAs that these countries had in 2000 are in effect.5"
a  Scenario 3:  It  assumes  that  three  SEE-economies  adopt  a  uniform  tariff  of
10 percent  on  their  MFN  imports  and,  as  above  in  Scenario  2,  their  respective
preferential  partners  in 2000 have a duty free access.
*  Scenario 4:  It examines  the effects of 'zeroing'  tariff rates on imports of industrial
products from the EU while retaining their 2000 tariff arrangements  on other imports.
Considering  assumptions and the quality of foreign trade data, the estimates  summarized
in  Table  14  should  be  treated  with  a  great  deal  of caution.  They  are  not  counterintuitive,
however.  In  fact,  they  fully  corroborate  expectations  derived- from  a  standard  analysis  of
geographically  discriminatory  barriers  imposed  by FTAs.52 The  model  tends to exaggerate  the
impact  of FTA  on  trade  flows,  because  of the  assumptions  about  perfectly  competitive  and
integrated  markets,  and full substitutability and homogeneity of products.  The latter in particular
tend to  overestimate  both  the  potential  for  trade creation  and  trade  diversion  and  therefore  net
change  in welfare.  Moreover,  the effects are larger for Albania, as they stem from two rather than
one FTA, as  is the case of Croatia and FYR Macedonia.
I  in  terms  of the  modeling  exercise,  this means that  imports  coming  from  preferential  partners  are not
subject to tariffs.  This does not apply to Albania, which-as of January 2002-has no FTA.  In the case of
Croatia,  duty-free  treatment applies  to  imports  from  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  FYR Macedonia,  Hungary
and  Slovenia.  For  FYR  Macedonia,  duty-free  access  applies  to  imports  from  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  FRY,
Slovenia and Turkey.
52 Although based on different methodology,  they are similar to results obtained by Green (1999).39
Yet, the results of estimates of welfare  implications of various scenarios  of tariff policy
confirm earlier observations.  First,  in order to minimize trade diversion and the resulting loss  in
welfare, unilateral  liberalization  should accompany  FTA.  Under  Scenario  I Albania has a loss in
welfare  because of FTA, and so does Croatia and FYR Macedonia.  The trade diversion  effect of
FTAs among them exceeds that of trade creation  for each of them.  The loss in welfare  is smaller
for Croatia and FYR Macedonia than for Albania  for two reasons:  first, the estimates capture the
total for Albania's two FTA and of only one FTA for the other two countries  and,  second, export
offer  of Albania  is  much  smaller  and  less  diversified.  The  potential  for diverting  exports  to
preferential  partners  is thus  smaller.  The negative  net change  in welfare  of each  country stems
mainly  from  the  fall  in  tariff  revenue.  This  is  the  classic  example  of FTAs  between  small
countries where the Agreement has barely any im1 pact on the consumer surplus because the prices
are not affected, but there  is loss of tariff revenue.  3
Table 14: Estimates of welfare effects of FTAs between Albania and FYR Macedonia and Croatia with
various scenarios of reductions of MFN rates (in million of US dollars and in percent)
SCENARIO  1 (FTA)  Albania"  FYR  Croatia
Macedonia
Increase  in total imports2  71 (7%)  11  (1%)  14 (0%)
Tariff revenue  (minus-loss; plus-increase)  -57  -8  -33
Change in net consumer surplus  15  1  1
Change in country welfare  -19  -1  -21
Change in country welfare (percent of GDP)  -0.52%  -0.03%  -0.10%
SCENARIO 2 (FTA and EU MFN for industrial products)  Albania"  FYR  Croatia
Macedonia
Increase in imports2i  130 (12%)  17 (1%)  158 (2%)
Tariff revenue (minus-loss; plus-increase)  -86  -104  -396
Change  in net consumer surplus  111  122  434
Change in country welfare  36  20  52
Change in country welfare (percent of GDP)  0.98%  0.59%  0.26%
SCENARIO  3 (10% uniform MFN tariff rate)  Albania'/  FYR  Croatia
Macedonia
Increase  in imports  19 (2%)  27 (1%)  330 (4%)
Tariff revenue  (minus-loss; plus-increase)  -10  -38  -187
Change in net consumer surplus  6  18  75
Change in country welfare  -4  -20  -112
Change in country welfare  (percent of GDP)  -0.10%  -0.59%  0.58%
SCENARIO  4 (elimination of tariffs on industrial imports  Albania  FYR  Croatia
from the EU)  Macedonia
Increase in total imports from the EU  202 (19%)  528 (28%)  4,020 (52%)
Tariff revenue (minus--loss; plus-increase)  -54  -126  -705
Change in net consumer surplus  73  140  511
Change in country welfare  19  -13  -191
Change in country  welfare (percent of GDP)  0.49%  -0.41%  -0.95%
"For  Albania the total change caused by FTA with FYR Macedonia  and Croatia.
In parentheses the change in imports in relation to total imports in 2000 in percent.
53  For a technical explanation of this phenomenon,  see Schiff (1997).40
Second,  unilateral  liberalization  combined  with  bilateral  liberalization  usually  leads  to
gains  in welfare.  Simulation  of Scenario  2  indicates  welfare  gains due to  lowering  of applied
MFN tariff rates on industrial products to EU levels but free of tariff peaks in the EU  MIFN tariff
schedule.  A large increase  in net consumer surplus more than  offsets the fall in tariff revenue for
all  countries.  Croatia  has a relatively  small welfare  gain under  Scenario  2 due to a huge fall  in
tariff revenue.54 Albania  gains  most when  reducing  tariff rates  to EU  levels-an  equivalent  of
one percent of its GDP.
What  is then the best policy option in terms of gains in welfare?  It is strikingly clear that
the worst policy option  is FTA without lowering MIFN tariff rates.  The only policy option under
which three of them have welfare gains is that of combining FTAs with the adoption of EU MFN
tariff rates  on  industrial  imports.  As  argued  earlier,  adoption  of the  same  external  tariffs  has
significant  advantage,  as  it  reduces the administrative  burden of running  rules of origin to  deal
with  'trade  deflection'55 and distortions  in  incentives  to allocate  resources.  Albania-the  only
country among SEE that has not yet concluded  FTA with its neighbors  has the most to gain from
combining  regional  FTAs  with  elimination  of tariffs  on  industrial  imports  from  the  EU,  i.e.,
Scenario 4.
Conclusion
Free trade  area encompassing  all non-EU member Balkan countries promises  gains to all
its  participants.  Although  the  aggregate  GDP  of  SEE  economies,  including  Bulgaria  and
Romania,  of around US$100  billion  may not strike as  particularly  high, this  is a relatively  large
market offering  economies  of scale  with  a  great potential  for  significantly reducing  transaction
costs.  Consider also that SEE-5  have  duty free access  to geographically  close Greece  with the
GDP of around  US$130  billion,  more  than  doubling the  aggregate  size  of the  Balkan  market.
Moreover,  the elimination of barriers to trade  is likely to  lead to its  expansion.  The absence of
cultural  and linguistic barriers  may contribute  to it.  Paradoxically, ethnic diversification that had
fueled  regional  conflicts  may  become  an  asset  in  a  new  environment,  once  the  lines  of
communication  across borders are allowed to develop.
The preceding analysis provides ample  evidence that there is a danger that potential gains
from  regional  integration  may turn  into  losses without  accompanying  MIFN  liberalization.  The
only way  to avoid this outcome  is to  combine  regional  liberalization  with  'synchronized'  MFN
liberalization  across  SEE  economies.  Static  welfare  analysis  leaves  beyond  any doubt that  the
best policy  option  is to  combine  all  dimensions  of trade  liberalization.  A  "big-bang  scenario"
would  involve  simultaneously zeroing  tariffs  in  intra-SEE-5  trade  and  on  imports  from  the EU,
while  reducing  MIFN  applied  tariff rates  on  industrial  products  to EU  levels.  Our calculations
suggest  that  this  is the  only  scenario  providing  welfare  gains  to  SEE-3-Albania,  Croatia  and
FYR Macedonia.
54  Croatia has  high  tariff rates  on industrial  products  imported  mostly  from  the  EU.  Increased  imports
magnified  by the contraction  in imports of these products  from MFN products produced the contraction  in
tariff revenue of US$286 million (see Table  15).
5  As mentioned  earlier,  'trade  deflection'  describes  a situation  when  an  importer  in a high-duty country
imports  a product through  a  low-duty country  and  then re-export  it to  the  importer's duty-free.  Rules  of
origin are used to prevent it.41
6.  POLICY  IMPLICATIONS
The challenge facing  the SEE-5  countries is to exploit opportunities offered by the EU-driven SA
process.  Opportunities  are huge and whether they will be fully exploited depends  largely on their
economic  policies.  While  this  analysis  has  focused  on  identifying  the  best  policy  moves  that
would maximize  benefits from trade liberalization,  the task goes well beyond  issues related to the
design of a foreign trade regime in the context of the SA process.  In fact, even the best-designed
scheme  of  trade  liberalization  will  fail  to  elicit  trade  response  unless  accompanied  by
complementary  reforms  in  the  investment  climate,  and  by  cooperation  in  addressing  regional
problems  including the removal of barriers to commercial  interaction.
The  SA  process  offers  unique  opportunities  to  SEE-5  governments  to  upgrade  their
institutions  to European  standards,  serving  as  both  an anchor making the reforms more credible
and a  guide to institutional  reforms.  The  SA process  provides  also  incentives  to  move  quickly
towards  "deeper"  integration,  i.e.,  convergence  to  efficiency-enhancing  components  of the
acquis.  It  is  this  "deeper"  integration  that  holds  the  greatest  promise  for  SEE-5  countries:
improved  market  access  alone  is  unlikely  to  yield  large  benefits,  partly  as  a  result  of  the
restrictive  EU  rules of origin  for  sensitive  products,  which  dominate  SEE-5  exports,  but  also
because  EU MFN tariffs on industrial  products are  low and  so are tariff margins  for preferential
suppliers.  However, achieving "deeper" integration is in the hands of SEE-5 rather then the EU.
The  SA  process  sets  the  stage  for  policy-induced  integration  along  two  dimensions:
liberalization  in trade with the EU and intra-regional  trade liberalization.  The two dimensions are
inseparable,  and must be pursued together to yield the greatest opportunity for gains.  The caveat
is that trade liberalization  along these two  dimensions without addressing  the third dimension  of
multilateral,  MFN-based  liberalization  may  be  counterproductive.  First,  European  and  intra-
regional  liberalization  without  complementary  multilateral  liberalization  would  lead  to  trade
diversion  and losses in  national economic welfare.  Second,  the restrictive rules of origin applied
by the  EU  to  sensitive  products  limit the  preferential  access  to  EU  markets  for  many  SEE-5
producers  and  require  that they  compete  on  the  same  footing  as  non-preferential  suppliers;  in
these cases, low external MFN tariffs offer access to more competitive  sources of supply of inputs
used  in  the  production  of  products  sold  in  preferential  markets,  thus  increasing  their
competitiveness.
In this light the  paper offers  empirical  support  to the view that fast liberalization  should
proceed along three rather than two dimensions as envisaged  in the SA process.  Three conditions
for maximizing welfare  are of particular importance.
I  First,  intra-regional  trade  liberalization  should  be  accompanied  by  multilateral
liberalization.  Since a  common objective of the SEE-5  governments  appears  to  be accession  to
the EU, the bottom  line of MFN liberalization  is alignment  of their MFN applied tariff schedule
to that of the EU, especially for industrial products.  SEE-5 tariffs on industrial  products are much
higher  than  in the EU  and  other  highly  industrialized  countries.  FTAs  among  SEE-5  without
MFN  liberalization  would  lead to diversion  of imports  to preferential  partners  at the expense  of
more  efficient  MFN  suppliers,  and  to  the  loss  of customs  revenue.  The  extent  of diversion
depends  on the levels of MFN  rates as well as on the level  and the  significance  of intra-industry
in their pre-FTA  mutual  trade.  The  lower are  MFN  rates  and the  higher mutual trade  together
with  a high  share  of intra-industry  trade,  the  lower  is the  potential  for  trade  diversion  and  the
welfare  loss.42
Second,  intra-regional  trade  liberalization  should  be  accompanied  by  an  accelerated
schedule  of removing  tariffs  on  imports  from  the  EU.  With  Croatia  accounting  for almost
50 percent of the aggregate  SEE-5  GDP and  GDP per capita  2.6 times larger than of the second
wealthiest  SEE-5  economy,  FYR Macedonia,  the danger  is that  intra-regional  trade integration
divorced  from  European  and  multilateral  liberalization  might  lead to  most  benefits  accruing  to
Croatia at the  expense  of poorer  SEE-5  countries.  This  would  defy the very purpose  of SEE-5
integration,  as it might trigger extra political tensions.
Third,  the  introduction  of reforms  broadening  tax  base  and  improving  efficiency  of
collection  of tax  revenues  are  critical  to  offset  losses  in  customs  revenues  and  ensure  fiscal
sustainability of trade liberalization.  Poorer SEE-5  economies  are  particularly dependent  on tax
revenues  and  without  tapping  alternative  sources  of revenue  their  capacity  to provide  public
services may be severely impaired.
Yet,  even  meeting  these  three  conditions  together  with  implementation  of  strong
measures  facilitating  cross-border  movement  of goods  will  not automatically  boost  trade  and
growth and improve competitiveness  of domestic producers.  Domestic environment unfriendly to
business  and  investment  activity  usually  leads to weaker  supply response to  trade liberalization.
So  do  cumbersome  customs  procedures  and  poor  infrastructure,  which  now appear  to present
probably  a  more  formidable  barrier  to trade  than  tariffs  alone.  The  combination  of structural
reforms and investments in infrastructure  is therefore critical to trade expansion.
Finally,  trade  liberalization  is not the  only mode  of regional  integration  that  can have
large positive economic impacts.  For instance,  some areas of regional cooperation addressing  the
supply  of regional  public  goods  where  everyone  loses  because  of the  absence  of cooperation
always  generate  huge  returns.  These  include  among  others the  development  of infrastructure,
sources  of energy,  water  management,  the  environment,  and  trade  facilitation  through  smooth
border procedures.  The latter  addresses  also barriers that  impose  real  costs  on  imports  such  as
due to excessive bureaucratic  delays, poor telecommunications,  and  postal and financial services.
The  sooner  they  are  implemented  the  better  every  SEE-5  is, as  they  all  represent  'win-win'
situations for all participants.
Regional  and MFN  liberalization  would  be jeopardized  if it were to lead to large  social
costs of adjustment and budget deficits due to the fall in  customs revenue.  Experience  from other
countries,  including  especially  the accession  countries  of Eastern  and Central  Europe,  suggests
that these problems can be addressed.
The loss  of customs revenue  is clearly  inevitable.  It can  be addressed,  however,  through
measures  expanding  tax  base  and  improving  collection  capacity  of tax  authorities.  This  is  a
relatively  straightforward  task, albeit difficult to  implement  because of administrative  resistance
to structural  reforms reducing the potential  for rents and corruption.  If anything, it only underlies
the importance of reforms complementary to trade liberalization.
Social costs of adjustment would  arise if the simultaneous  switch to EU MFN tariffs on
industrial  products  and  free  trade  within  South  Eastern  Europe  were  to  wipe  away  whole
industries and  bring about massive unemployment.  Although  economic theory does not give an
unambiguous  answer to this question,56 empirical  evidence  from transition  seems to suggest  that
56  These  fears may have  been justified  to some extent by findings  of the new  trade theory  and economic
geography  models.  While  the new  trade theory  suggests the  overall  benefits  are  likely to be significantly
larger than those suggested by traditional  approaches  economic geography models  allow for the possibility43
the  probability  of such  an  outcome  is  rather  small.  In  the transition  economies  of Eastern  and
Central  Europe,  it was the  collapse of central  planning  rather  than trade  liberalization  that  has
brought about industrial  devolution  and contraction  in industrial  activity  during the initial stages
of  transition.  In  fact,  countries  that  adopted  a  gradual  approach  to  liberalization  and
macroeconomic  stabilization  experienced  a  deeper  and  more  prolonged  transformational
recession  than  those  that  followed  the  path  of radical  liberalization.  Zeroing  tariff rates  on
industrial  imports  from the EU had not led to a catastrophic  relocation  of industries  in transition
economies  that signed the Europe Association  Agreements.  Even though SEE-5  countries  have
yet  to  open  their  markets  fully  to  competition  from  imports  from  the  EU,  they  had  already
undergone  readjustment  due  to  the  shift  to  market  clearing  prices  and  the  collapse  of cross
subsidies.  Hence,  it  seems  that  accelerated  liberalization  in  conditions  of  market  access  is
unlikely to impose painful  adjustment.
Yet, vigorously pursed  structural  reforms  improving the business climate and the quality
of public  administration,  including tax and  customs  administration,  are  indispensable  to trigger
growth  and  readjustment  of production structures  to take advantage  of opportunities  offered  by
European  and  international  markets.  While  this does not guarantee  a massive  inflow of FDI or
surge in domestic investment,  it certainly  increases their probability.  As empirical evidence  from
Ireland  (Barry  1996)  or  Poland  (World  Bank  1997)  strongly  suggests,  FDI  are  particularly
important  in  assuring  that  engagement  in  a  preferential  trading  arrangement  with  the  highly
developed EU do not lead to a catastrophic  relocation of industries.
CONCLUDING  COMMENT
While the SA  process  provides  general  guidelines  for the  development of economic ties among
SEE-5 countries,  it leaves many issues open to negotiations  and different solutions.  In exchange
for  EU  assistance,  prospect  of EU  accession,  and  continuation  of preferential  access  to  EU
markets,  SEE-5  governments  have  to  upgrade  their  institutions  and  governance  to  European
standards,  engage  in mutual  regional  cooperation  including  free  trade  and  establish  free  trade
areas with the EU.  Respective  schedules  and details  of FTAs  among  SEE countries have  been
left to negotiations with the latter already resulting in the MOU and the recent completion of most
bilateral FTAs among the signatory countries.
The  paper examined benefits to  SEE-5 of trade liberalization  along these two dimensions
and  suggested  conditions  under  which  gains  could  be  maximized.  These  conditions  could  be
summarized as  follows:  First,  SEE-5  countries should implement tariff reductions on imports of
industrial products  from the EU at the same time when they fully implement  SEE-5  FTAs.  This
would  have two  important  consequences:  it would reduce  dangers  associated  with  South-South
integration  (i.e.,  relocation of industries  to more  developed  partners),  and even up  conditions in
access for EU exporters to those they face in other SEE countries-Bulgaria and Romania.
that  gains-especially  during  the  early  stages  of  integration-will  be  distributed  in favor  of a more
developed  partner-the  EU.  Traditional  trade  models  suggest  that capital  and/or  labor  mobility  brings
convergence  thanks to changes in  relative prices brought about by lower  import prices and improved export
prices,  and a higher marginal product  per capita attracting  higher investment  and growth  (Baldwin  1989).
On  the  other  hand,  economic  geography  models  suggest  that  firms  operating  under  the  conditions  of
imperfect competition  and economies  of scale, i.e.,  in increasing  returns-to-scale  industries, tend to cluster
together  drawn  by the  availability  of supplies  due  to the  higher  concentration  of demand  (Krugman and
Venables  1993).  This  would  point  to  the  inevitability  of  relocation  of  industrial  activity  to  highly
developed countries with high concentration of demand.44
Second,  the  implementation  of both  dimensions  of regional  trade  liberalization  should
be  accompanied  by  reductions  in SEE-5  MFN  applied  tariff rates  on  industrial  imports,  and
ultimately bring them  to EU external  tariffs on these  imports.  Alternatively,  if SEE-5  decide  to
lower tariffs  on  industrial  products  from the  EU gradually,  then they  should  lower their  MFN
tariffs to the rates  levied on imports  from the EU (unless those  exceed EU MvFN  rates, in which
case  the  EU  rates  should  be  adopted).  If  however  they  move  to  free  trade  in  one  move
simultaneously  with  their SEE  FTAs, then  they should  all  adopt  simultaneously  EU MFN  rates
applied  to  industrial  products.  This  would  amount  to  creating  a  "virtual"  customs  union
encompassing  the  SEE-5  countries  and  the  EU,  and  thus  would  reduce  the  extent  of trade
diversion.
Third,  while  even  a  "virtual"  customs  union  encompassing  SEE-5  and  EU  countries
would  reduce the  extent of trade diversion,  formalizing  a customs union that would  also  include
the other SEE countries would provide  an opportunity to eliminate the need to use rules of origin.
These  appear to  be  one of the  main obstacles  to  SEE-5  exports to the EU.  A  'virtual'  customs
union  with  the EU  restricted  to  non-sensitive  industrial  products  may  be  a  better  option,  both
economically and politically,  as this would require  adopting neither the EU's  restrictive  policies
vis-a-vis  sensitive products,  especially  agricultural  ones, nor its preferences  to numerous trading
partners.  The  political  weakness  of a  full-fledged  customs  union  might  be  that  it would  be
perceived  as  an  alternative  to  membership  and  thus would  reduce  pressures  towards  structural
reforms.
Finally,  another  way  of reducing,  albeit  not eliminating,  the  impact  of rules  of origin
would  be  for the  SEE-5  countries  to  become  part of the  Pan-European  Cumulation  of Origin
Agreement.  The current rules of origin  envisaging  bilateral cumulation  discourage  SEE-5  firms
from developing mutual  production  links oriented toward  supplying  EU markets,  because  inputs
from  other  SEE-5  countries  are  treated  as  "external"  imports.  The  establishment  of "diagonal
cumulation"  both in the FTAs with the EU and those with the SEE countries  would address  this
problem.  Since this might  stress limited administrative  capacities of some  SEE-5  countries,  this
should  remain  as  a  policy option  worth  exploring  in the  near  future,  i.e.,  when  its  benefits  in
terms of stimulating  intra-industry  trade become more obvious.
Trade  liberalization,  however,  is  one  of many  dimensions  crucial to the  success  of the
Stabilization  and  Association  process.  While  our analysis  focused  on  trade,  structural  reforms
and regional cooperation are of equal, if not greater importance.  Trade  liberalization  along three
dimensions  alone  is unlikely  to  contribute  to  economic  growth  without  concurrent  efforts  to
improve  infrastructure, trade  facilitation, business and investment climate,  and governance.45
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APPENDIX  1: PARTIAL-EQUILIBRIUM  MODEL SPECIFICATION
The model  aims to  estimate the consequences  of elimination  of tariffs  in country  i from  imports
from countryj.  Import demand for each HS-6-digit product of country i = Albania, Croatia  and
FYR MACEDONIA  is given by:
mi  ~~Ai
[pw (1+  TA)E
where:  Pw --  the  world  price;  T1  --  MFN  tariff rate  in  country  i; Ai  --  demand  parameter  in
country I; E  -- the import demand  elasticity (common to all countries in our simulations).
Demand  elasticities  at six-digit-level  were obtained  from the  UNCTAD Trade  Policy  Simulation
Model  (TPSM).  Supply  elasticity  was  set  at  1 (tests  run using  supply  elasticity  of 0.5  did  not
affect the results).
Export supply of countryj to country i is given by:
Xj ), =` B.j [P,, (I + Tj.17j)-]9
Where 6)  is the export  supply elasticity  (common to  all countries)  that in the  simulation
was set at 1  ..nh+  is the level of tariff preference granted by country  i to exports fromj.  Thus,  if
17  ,,4= 0  imports of i fromj have to*pay country i's MFN tariff.  Similarly if fl4= 1 exports from
j  receive the domestic price in i.  BX  is a supply parameter.
World prices are exogenous  and were obtained using a combination of Germany's,  USA's
and France's  prices, by dividing values of each  product by its quantity.
All  demand  and  supply  parameters  are  calibrated  at  6-digit  level  of the  Harmonized
System  using  WITS's  trade  data.  For the  MFN tariffs  national  tariff schedules  at 8-digit  level
were transformed  into 6-digits level by calculating the sample average.
BJ=  -l  XI  P  Ai =M  if(+T)
In order to assess the tffect on bilateral trade of an elimination of tariff rates to partner
country, the model calculates P wh  or the hypothetical  price assuming market clearance among
two partners:
P.h =  ia wh  (1(+51
Then the new domestic price Pd in importing country  is estimated:
*  P-  Ph if P. > P,h > Pw (I + MFN); case where clearing prices with partner country are
above  world  prices  but below  world  prices  with  tariffs  =>  domestic  prices  would  be  the
clearing prices
*  Pd  Pw(l + MFN) if  PWh  2 PW  (I + MFN); this  is the case  when the  clearing  prices  with
partner country are higher than the world prices  + tariff => the price would be world price +
tariff.
*  Pd  = PW if P,,, < PW,;  Case  where  the  clearing  prices  with  partner  country  are  lower  than
world prices => the price would be the world price.
Finally  using  demand  and  supply  equations  the  model  estimates  the  new  import  and
exports data and estimate changes in tariff revenue and welfare.Policy Research  Working Paper Series
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